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I. INTRODUCTION

One of U.S. corporate law's most salient features is its
flexibility. Those who control and manage the corporation are given a
long leash. This is particularly evident when the United States is
compared with other countries in studies like the World Bank's
annual Doing Business project. According to the detailed study that
developed the World Bank methodology for measuring investor
protection,1 the United States scored a 0.33 for "ex ante private control
of self-dealing." This was not only below the world average of 0.36, but
also well below the 0.58 average for common law countries. The
United Kingdom, in contrast, received a perfect score of 1.0.2
That the country with the world's largest and deepest capital
markets has, in some respects, among the world's looser corporate
laws may seem counterintuitive. It works because of the strength of
two underlying institutions. One is our disclosure system, which
assures investors that they see the full picture. The other is the
fiduciary concept, which replaces standardized prohibitions with the
opportunity to evaluate managerial conduct on a more holistic basis.
Applied soundly, the fiduciary concept filters opportunistic behavior
by those in control of a corporation without deterring good faith efforts
to further shareholder welfare in ways that might run afoul of a more
technical set of restrictions.
The critical issue, therefore, is who performs the fiduciary
evaluation.
Traditionally,
courts
have
exercised
principal
responsibility through shareholder derivative suits. However, over the
last three decades, this task has shifted to others, chiefly the
independent members of a corporation's board of directors.
Shareholders continue to file derivative suits, but they no longer play
a central role in the evaluation. Law reviews' attention to the topic
likewise has declined. Current scholarship tends to focus on either
recent cases in local jurisdictions or comparative law work. Ironically,
although we rely on the derivative suit less and less in this country,
we are eager to see whether other countries embrace it. To invert a
familiar bit of nostalgia, the derivative suit seems to be "forgotten, but
not gone."
This Article examines the factors contributing to the decline of
the derivative suit and evaluates whether corporations and their
shareholders are better off as a result. To assess the state of derivative
1.
Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, Nov. 16, 2006,
http://www.doingbusiness.org/documentslProtecting-Investors-Self-Dealing.pdf.
2.
Id. at tbl.2.
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litigation today, it surveys opinions involving derivative suits
involving Delaware corporations brought in federal and Delaware
courts. In all, 294 cases are considered. This examination suggests
that the "forgotten" derivative suit is largely the result of
preoccupation with issues facing highly visible, large cap corporations,
where a number of alternatives and substitutes have developed to
supply most (but not all) of the benefits traditionally associated with
derivative litigation. Derivative suits continue to play an essential
role, however, in other sectors of the corporate law landscape,
particularly for transactions involving controlling persons. Courts
have been more creative recently in finding ways to preserve the
minority shareholder's access to court in these sectors, without
displacing the framework developed to restrict the typical large cap
derivative suit.
The Article is organized as follows: Part II traces the history of
how, beginning in the late 1970s, courts shifted their responsibility for
overseeing fiduciary conduct to independent directors by taking a
more restrictive approach to derivative suits in general and to the role
of pre-suit demand in particular. Part III analyzes the reasons for this
shift and considers whether subsequent developments have born them
out. Part IV reports the results of a survey of judicial opinions.
Emerging from that survey is a three-category typology of derivative
suits, suggesting the need to look beyond the conventional closely
held/publicly held dichotomy. While one category ("Closely Held") is
confined to close corporations and other closely held firms, the other
two involve publicly traded corporations, with derivative suits playing
a very different role in each. One category ("Corporate Impropriety")
includes derivative suits seeking to impose personal liability on the
board for a discrete act of corporate wrongdoing. Corporations in this
category tend to be larger and shareholdings more widely dispersed.
The final category ("Exploitation of Control") is confined to suits
challenging transactions between the corporation and those who
control it. It is in this category that the derivative suit continues to
make its most important contributions, both as a source of
compensation and deterrence for the corporation's minority
shareholders and as a public good. After analyzing the distinctive
issues raised by each of the three categories in Part IV, Part V briefly
concludes with a look at some broader implications.
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II. SLCS, THE DEMAND REQUIREMENT, AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE-A
BRIEF LOOK BACK

In July 1976, a federal district court in New York decided Gall
v. Exxon Corp.3 As is often the case with groundbreaking judge-made
law, the opinion reads as if its outcome followed inexorably from wellestablished precedent. But the decision marked the beginning of a
fundamental shift in the interaction between courts of equity and
corporate boards.
In Gall, plaintiffs brought a derivative suit seeking to impose
liability on Exxon's directors and officers for alleged payments of $59
million to Italian political interests. In response, Exxon's board
appointed a special litigation committee ("SLC") consisting of three
directors who had joined the board after the challenged payments had
been terminated. After a four month investigation led by the retired
Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the SLC issued a
detailed report, on the basis of which it concluded that maintaining
the lawsuit was contrary to the interests of Exxon and its
shareholders. 4 Relying heavily on a series of older U.S. Supreme Court
cases, 5 the court agreed that so long as the SLC members acted
independently and in good faith, their6 decision to terminate the suit
fell within the business judgment rule.
For the two or three years following the Gall decision, the law
remained unsettled. Several courts reached the opposite result and
declined to apply the business judgment rule to SLC determinations;
all of these decisions ultimately would be reversed. 7 By 1979, the Gall
court's approach had carried the day in both federal8 and state courts. 9

The crowning event was the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Burks v.
Lasker, a derivative suit challenging an investment company's

3.
418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
4.
Id. at 514.
See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
5.
418 F. Supp. at 514-19.
6.
Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Parkoff v.
7.
Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 425 N.Y.S.2d 599 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (reversing trial court's refusal to
dismiss), aff'd, 425 N.E.2d 820 (N.Y. 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 408 N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1978), aff'd as modified, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979); see also Cramer v. Gen. Tel. & Elec.
Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 273-76 (3d Cir. 1978) (reserving decision).
8.
Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Auerbach and Abbey reflect a
clear trend in corporate law, and we are confident that a California court would follow this
trend."); Gaines v. Haughton (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 1979), affd, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981);
Rosengarten v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Abbey v. Control Data
Corp., 460 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Minn. 1978), affld, 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979).
Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d 994.
9.
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purchase of Penn Central commercial paper. 10 Below, the Second
Circuit had reasoned that it would be contrary to the federal
Investment Company Act to allow a minority of the board, no matter
how independent, to dismiss the shareholder's complaint against the
majority directors." A unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Brennan, disagreed. After recognizing that the
disinterested directors' power to dismiss a derivative suit was
essentially a question of state law, the Court determined that the
existence of that power did not run afoul of the federal regulatory
scheme. Inasmuch as the "cornerstone of the [Act's] effort to control
conflicts of interest within mutual funds is the requirement that at
least 40% of a fund's board be composed of independent outside
directors," the Court reasoned that allowing those directors to
terminate a derivative suit was consistent with the Act.1 2 "Indeed, it
would have been paradoxical for Congress to have been willing to rely
largely upon 'watchdogs' to protect shareholder interests and yet,
where the 'watchdogs' have done precisely that, require that they be
3
totally muzzled."'
Over the next decade, an occasional state court would buck the
trend and withhold or narrow the availability of the business
judgment rule-most notably the Delaware Court of Chancery in
Maldonado v. Flynn.14 However, each attempt was eventually
15
overruled, by either an appellate court or the legislature.
Especially within the academic community, the arrival of this
broad judicial deference to SLC decisionmaking provoked serious
concern. Corporate
law scholars openly worried about the "death"'16 or
"extinction"' 7 of the derivative suit, of "lock[ing the] shareholders'
door."' 8 Using words like "shocking," 19 "staggering," 20 and
10. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
11. Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
12. Burks, 441 U.S. at 482.
13. Id. at 485.
14. 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779
(Del. 1981).
15. In addition to Maldonado, see Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d
709, 716-18 (Iowa 1983) (superseded by IOWA CODE § 490.744(2) (2007)); Alford v. Shaw, 358
S.E.2d 323 (N.C. 1987) (superseded by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-44(a) (2007)).
16. George W. Dent, Jr., The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The
Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 96 (1980).
17. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An
Evaluation and a Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 261 (1981).
18. Richard M. Buxbaum, "Maldonado"Cases Could Lock Shareholders' Door, LEG. TIMES
WASH., Oct. 13, 1980, at 26.

19.
20.

Dent, supra note 16, at 109.
Buxbaum, supranote 18.
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"indefensible" 21 to describe this judicial development, writers called
upon the courts to rise above the formulaic application of doctrine and
the mistaking of form for substance to see the larger implications of
22
their decisions.
Why did Gall, Burks, and their progeny generate so much
controversy? One reason was that, by empowering the corporation's
outside directors to displace judicial scrutiny, this new doctrine
seemed to turn on its head the institutional reform that was central to
the recently enhanced focus on corporate governance. Another reason
was a perceived disconnect from the traditional view of the role played
by the derivative suit's requirement of pre-suit demand. The next two
sections explore each of these concerns in turn.
A. Origins of the SLC
The philosophical lineage of the independent board
committee-of which Exxon's SLC was but one example-is traceable
to dissatisfaction with the passive role played by the typical outside
director of a large, publicly traded corporation. This role typically fell
somewhere on a continuum between figurehead and friendly adviser.
To be sure, this was a longstanding phenomenon, but two events
pushed these concerns to the fore in the early 1970s and helped them
to coalesce into the foundation for what is now termed "corporate
governance." One was the 1972 publication of an interview-based,
comprehensive academic study of what directors do: Directors: Myth
and Reality, by Harvard Professor Myles Mace. 23 The other was Penn
Central's collapse in June 1970. Formed by a merger of the historic
Pennsylvania and New York Central railroads in 1968, the company
later.
Government
years
only
two
bankruptcy
declared
investigations 24 and the popular press 25 depicted the company's
outside directors as disengaged and unaware of the company's
precarious financial condition until it was too late.
21. Janet Johnson, The Business Judgment Rule: A Review of Its Application to the Problem
of IllegalForeign Payments, 6 J. CORP. L. 481, 481 (1981).
22. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 17, at 262-63; Dent, supra note 16, at 109; Walter
Werner, CorporationLaw in Search of Its Future, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1611, 1664 (1981); Mark A.
Underberg, Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65
CORNELL L. REV. 600, 601-02, 632-33 (1980).
23.

MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971).

24. THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL COMPANY: STAFF REPORT OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION TO THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

pt.I-F, at 151-72 (1972).
25.

JOSEPH R. DAUGHEN & PETER BINZEN, THE WRECK OF THE PENN CENTRAL 17, 259

(1971); Robert Townsend, Book Review, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1971, at BR 3.
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The principal analytical framework that emerged to address
these concerns is most closely associated with the work of Professor
Mel Eisenberg. Writing in the mid-1970s, he conceded that the law's
traditional view that the board of directors "manages" the corporation
was no longer realistic. 26 It was feasible and desirable, however, that
the board "monitor" those who manage the corporation. Thus, the
monitoring model of the board of directors was born, and with it a
series of reforms to facilitate that task-more outside directors, with
fewer economic and personal ties to management, and the assignment
of key tasks to independent board committees. Professor Eisenberg
would go on to serve as Reporter for the American Law Institute's
("ALI's") Principles of Corporate Governance project, which initially
27
sought to codify some of these reforms.
While these broader developments frame the heightened
attention to the board's monitoring function that emerged in the
1970s, specific credit for developing the SLC itself goes to the
Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") Enforcement Division
under Irving M. Pollack, especially to Stanley Sporkin. 28 The impetus
for developing the SLC was the post-Watergate revelation of illegal or
questionable political and foreign payments by many of the country's
leading corporations. After the Special Prosecutor brought charges
against several corporations and their senior executives for illegal
campaign contributions, the SEC began to look into the off-the-books

26.

MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 139-

85 (1976); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern
Corporation:Officers, Directors,and Accountants, 63 CAL. L. REV. 375 (1975). While Eisenberg
was instrumental in articulating the "monitoring' framework as such, other authors and
institutions were contemporaneously advancing ideas along the same line. For a summary, see
Elliott J. Weiss & Donald E. Schwartz, Using Disclosure to Activate the Board of Directors,LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1977, at 63, 73-79; Werner, supra note 22, at 1654-56.
27.

PRINCIPLES

OF

CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE

&

STRUCTURE:

RESTATEMENT

&

RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 3.02-.07 (Tentative Draft no. 1, 1982). Following the controversy
generated by Tentative Draft no. 1, many of these proposals were converted into
"recommendations of corporate practice" made to "corporations and their counsel, not to courts or
legislatures." PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS pt. III-A

(1992).
28.

See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 540 n* (revised ed. 1995);

Stanley Sporkin, SEC Developments in Litigation and the Molding of Remedies, 29 BUS. LAW.
121, 122 (Special Issue, 1974) ("I believe that the molding of remedies is a very important area
for many of your clients ....[W]e [the enforcement staff] like to look upon ourselves as doctors
trying to cure or perhaps preserve a temporarily ill but viable entity."). Sporkin, Pollack's
deputy, was appointed Director of the Division in February 1974 when Pollack was named a
Commissioner.
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"slush funds" and falsified financial records that had facilitated these
29
payments.
Even before these Watergate-related developments, the SEC
had begun to seek two novel forms of ancillary relief in enforcement
actions-the appointment of new, independent directors to the
corporation's board and internal corporate investigations, typically
employing outside special counsel and sometimes special auditors as
well. 3° Unlike the traditional mainstay of the SEC's enforcement
31
weapons-an injunction against violations of the securities laws these new remedies provided the mechanism for monitoring ongoing
compliance and "rehabilitating" the issuer. And from the issuer's
perspective, they were preferable to the appointment of a receiver,
which might trigger a default under loan agreements and disrupt
relations with suppliers, employees, and customers.3 2 The leading
example of this new approach was the 1974 consent decree between
the SEC and Mattel, Inc.3 3 The decree required that Mattel add a
sufficient number of new independent directors to constitute a
majority of its board, create three new independent board committees,
and appoint a special counsel to file an investigatory report with both
the SEC and the court. In particular, one feature of the decree
qualifies it as the archetype of today's SLC. 34 Three of the independent
directors were to serve on a new "Litigation and Claims Committee,"
which was to review pending and future claims and questions of

29. Division of Corporate Finance's Views and Comments on Disclosures Relating to the
Making of Illegal Campaign Contributions by Public Companies and/or Their Officers and
Directors, Securities Act Release No. 5466, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
79,969 (Mar. 8, 1974).
30. See Arthur F. Mathews, Recent Trends in SEC Requested Ancillary Relief in SEC Level
Injunctive Actions, 31 Bus. LAW. 1323, 1334-36 (listing cases). See generally James R. Farrand,
Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1779 (1976); Chris R.
Ottenweller, Comment, Court-Appointed Directors: Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law
Enforcement Actions, 64 GEO. L.J. 737 (1976); Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC
Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1188 (1975).
31. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2000); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (2000).
32. See SEC v. Bowler, 427 F.2d 190, 196 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Handler, [1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 96,519, at 94,024 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 1978); Arthur F.
Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 656-57 (1984); Stanley
Sporkin, supra note 28, at 123-24.
33. SEC v. Mattel, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 6467, 1974 WL 163306 (D.D.C. Aug. 5,
1974), amended, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,807 (D.D.C. Oct. 1,
1974).
34. See, e.g., Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative
Litigation:Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 BUS. LAW. 503, 512 n.38
(1989); Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Governance-The Role of Special Litigation Committees,
68 WASH. L. REV. 79, 88 (1993).
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conflict of interest involving the company's officers, directors,
controlling persons, and employees. This committee also was
responsible for approving the settlement or other disposition of those
claims.
Beginning with the American Ship Building Corporation's
settlement in October 1974, 35 the SEC extended this approach to
settlements of actions charging corporate nondisclosure of illegal or
questionable payments. By September 1976, the SEC had obtained
almost twenty such consent decrees8 6 with such household corporate
names as Gulf Oil, 3M, Northrop, and Lockheed. The settlements
contained essentially the same elements, including a requirement that
the corporation create a special review committee composed
exclusively of independent directors. Typically using independent
counsel and accountants, the committee was to investigate the
irregularities alleged in the SEC's complaint and submit a public
report to the board of directors, which was responsible for reviewing
and implementing the committee's recommendations. 37 Many
corporations preempted the SEC by launching their own internal
investigations, again frequently using independent board committees
and outside counsel.38 Starting in 1975, the SEC institutionalized
these practices with its "voluntary disclosure program."3 9 A May 1976
report by the SEC to the Senate Banking Committee identified ninetyfive companies that had disclosed illegal or questionable payments.
Ultimately, almost 400 publicly traded corporations would be
implicated, 40 with Exxon's $59 million being the largest of the
disclosed payments.
It is therefore understandable why Gall and its progeny
disquieted corporate governance advocates. Unable to pursue each
instance of questionable payments on its own, the SEC had leveraged
35. SEC v. Am. Ship Bldg. Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 6534, 1974 SEC Lexis 2553 (Oct.
4, 1974).
36. See S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., REPORT OF THE
SEC ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 3-5, Exhibit B

(Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter SEC Questionable Payments Report]; Edward D. Herlihy &
Theodore A. Levine, Corporate Crisis: The Overseas Payment Problem, 8 LAw & POLy INT'L BUS.
547, 578-79 & n.185 (1976).
37. SEC Questionable Payments Report, supra note 36, at 4-5; Herlihy & Levine, supra
note 36, at 581-82.
38. See Mathews, supra note 32, at 666-70.
39. Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on InternationalEconomic Policy of the H. Comm. on InternationalRelations, 94th
Cong. 186-88 (1975) (statement of SEC Commissioner Philip A. Loomis, Jr.); SEC Questionable
Payments Report, supranote 36, at 6-13.
40.

ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 149 (1982); SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 542.
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41
its resources by pressuring corporations to investigate themselves.
That process then was used to limit judicial scrutiny, even in cases
where this self-investigation had revealed significant problems.

B. Role of the Demand Requirement
Federal and state pleading rules typically require that the
complaint in a derivative suit set forth the efforts, if any, made by the
plaintiff to obtain action from the directors and the reasons for either
the failure to obtain that action or for not making the effort. 42 What
substantive implications flow from this mandated recital? At the time
of Gall, two conflicting lines of thought circulated.
One line saw the demand requirement as the procedural
complement to the substantive proposition that the decision whether
to assert a legal claim belonging to the corporation was, in essence, a
business decision. As such, this decision belonged exclusively to the
corporation's board of directors, whose resolution of the issue should
be shielded from judicial second guessing by the business judgment
rule. Some have termed this substantive dimension the "standing"
requirement, to distinguish it from the procedural issues surrounding
the need to make a demand. 43 Proponents of this position chiefly relied
on a series of older decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court. 44 Closer to
the time of Gall, three federal courts of appeals, along with several
district courts, had reiterated this doctrine. 45 All of these decisions
share a limiting characteristic that is not clear on the face of the rule
41. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 541-42.
42. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(c)
(McKinney 2003).
43. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 17, at 262; Daniel R. Fischel, Comment, The Demand
and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 168, 168 n.5
(1976).
44. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917); Corbus v.
Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455 (1903); Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450
(1881); see also Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 342-44 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). Justice Brandeis's observations in the United Copper case summarize the Court's
position:
Whether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts a cause of action for
damages is, like other business questions, ordinarily a matter of internal
management, and is left to the discretion of the directors, in the absence of instruction
by vote of the stockholders. Courts interfere seldom to control such discretion ....
United Copper, 244 U.S. at 263-64.
45. Ash v. Int'l Bus. Machs., Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965); Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309
F.2d 912, 921-22 (8th Cir. 1962); Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1957);
Bernstein v. Mediobanca Banca di Credito Finanziario-S.p.A., 69 F.R.D. 592, 595-97 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Klotz v. Consol. Edison Co., 386 F. Supp. 577, 581-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Kemper v. Am.
Broad. Cos., 365 F. Supp. 1272, 1274 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
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they set forth: they involve suits against unaffiliated third parties.
Obviously, different sensitivities arise when the issue is whether the
corporation should sue a competitor on antitrust grounds or challenge
the constitutionality of a tax, rather than when the directors are asked
to sue themselves or their colleagues on the board. 46 As to the latter, it
is difficult to find even dicta, much less a clear pre-Gall holding, on
whether the board's power to exercise its business judgment to
foreclose a derivative suit extended to suits against the directors
themselves.4 7 Yet this is the line of cases that the Gall court elected to
apply to the suit against Exxon's leadership, 48 and the decisions that
49
followed never questioned seriously the aptness of these cases.
The alternative line of thinking saw the demand requirement
merely as an intra-corporate exhaustion of remedies doctrine. Once
the shareholder either made a demand and was rejected or
demonstrated that demand would be futile, she was free to proceed
with the suit, the board's business judgment notwithstanding. Prior to
Gall, this second line appears to have been the prevailing view in
cases where the suit was against the corporation's directors or senior
management.5 0 In many cases, however, the defendant did not raise

46. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1258-60 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 17, at 265-71; Note,
Demand on Directorsand Shareholdersas a Prerequisiteto a Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REV.
746, 759-60 (1960). For a typology of the cases, see Dent, supra note 16, at 100-04.
47. The few examples include Findley v. Garrett, 240 P.2d 421, 425-29 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1952); S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New Eng. Theatres Operating Corp., 93 N.E.2d 241,
247-49 (Mass. 1950). In Findley, the court upheld the board's refusal to commence suit where
nine of the corporation's eleven directors were unaffiliated with the principal defendant, and all
or most of them had joined the board after the challenged transactions. The court in Solomont
held that the shareholders, by majority vote, had the power to terminate a derivative suit even
though the defendant was a director or officer. The opinion suggested that the same result might
apply to a majority vote by the board.
48. Another Southern District judge likewise invoked this line of cases the year before in
Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978),
rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
49. The principal exception was Maldonado, 413 A.2d at 1257-60.
50. Papilsky v. Berndt, 503 F.2d 554, 555-56 (2d Cir. 1974); Sohland v. Baker, 141 A. 277,
281-82 (Del. 1927); Anderson v. Johnson, 119 A. 642, 644 (R.I. 1923); cf. Nussbacher v. Cont'l Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust, 518 F.2d 873, 878-79 (7th Cir. 1975) (demand not required when board had
previously made clear that suit should not be brought); see also Note, supra note 46, at 760 ("If
the alleged wrongdoer is a director, officer, or other agent of the corporation it seems that a suit
against him should be permitted, since the high standards of fiduciary responsibility require that
he be held directly accountable for his malfeasance even when the board would protect him.").
Alternatively, even if the shareholder did not automatically acquire the right to sue following
rejection of demand, at least one court claimed the discretion to decide on its own that the suit
had sufficient merit to proceed notwithstanding the board's opposition. Groel v. United Elec. Co.,
61 A. 1061, 1063-64 (N.J. Ch. 1905).
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the demand issue to contest the plaintiffs right to proceed, 51 perhaps
because the courts (at least the federal courts) generally were seen as
lenient in construing the demand requirement. 52 In short, before the
53
late 1970s, the issue of demand was not that important.
This quickly changed after Gall and the other questionable
payments cases. When the SLC issue reached the Delaware courts in
litigation involving the Zapata Corporation, both the Court of
Chancery and the Supreme Court seized the opportunity to spell out
the demand requirement's role. The Court of Chancery held that,
notwithstanding the recent developments in federal court, Delaware
adhered to the exhaustion-of-remedies view. The court reasoned that
once demand is made and the corporation refuses to bring suit on a
claim alleging that directors breached their fiduciary duty, "the
stockholder is vested with a primary and independent right to redress
the wrong by bringing a derivative suit."54 The Delaware Supreme
Court reversed, separating derivative suits in which demand is
required but the board refuses to bring suit from those in which
demand is excusable as futile. For the former, the business judgment
'55
rule protects the board's decision not to sue unless it is "wrongful.
Even when demand is excused, the board does not forgo all authority
over the litigation. It retains the power to appoint an SLC, whose
decision is subject to a two-step process. First, the corporation has the
burden of proving the SLC's independence, its good faith, and the
reasonableness of its investigation and basis for its conclusions. Even
when that burden is satisfied, the court may substitute its own
business judgment, 56 though few courts have exercised this
57
opportunity.
Given the rejection of the exhaustion-of-remedies view, the test
for whether demand is required or excused took on far greater
significance. Not surprisingly, given the law's recent direction, the

51.

Dent, supra note 16, at 100 n.21.

52.

7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

1831, at 375 (1972) (superseded). For surveys of the courts' willingness to excuse demand in the
years before Gall, see Fischel, supra note 43, at 170-82; Note, supra note 46, at 753-54.
53. Richard M. Buxbaum, Conflict-of-Interest Statutes and the Need for a Demand on
Directors in Derivative Actions, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1122, 1123 (1980); Coffee & Schwartz, supra note
17, at 262; Note, supra note 46, at 759.
54. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1263 (Del Ch. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
55. Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 784 n.10.
56. Id. at 788-89.
57. The best-known example is Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 892-97 (2d Cir. 1982). See also
Peller v. Southern Co., 707 F. Supp. 525, 530-31 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (Zapata's second step as
alternative rationale), affd, 911 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1990).

20081

FORGOTTENDERIVATIVE SUIT

399

result was restrictive. If plaintiffs could establish demand futility
simply by naming a majority of the board as defendants-because they
had approved the challenged transaction and thus would be reluctant
to sue themselves-then the courts' enhanced commitment to
preserving the board's control over shareholder litigation would be
subverted. 58 The Delaware court's solution, in Aronson v. Lewis, was
to link the demand requirement to the availability of the business
judgment rule.5 9 Specifically, to establish demand futility, the
complaint must allege "particularized facts" that create a reasonable
doubt that "(1) the directors are disinterested and independent and (2)
the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid
exercise of business judgment." 60 Because of the business judgment
rule, the court saw the threat of personal liability for approving the
transaction as insufficient, by itself, to render a director "interested"
61
for purposes of excusing demand.
The Aronson court took an even stricter approach to the
argument for excusing demand because the principal defendant (the
corporation's seventy-five-year-old chairman, who was granted a
permanently renewable extension to his employment agreement)
owned forty-seven percent of the corporation's stock and personally
selected each of the directors. Even majority ownership, the court said,
would not strip the board of the presumption of independence. In
addition to the existence of control, the plaintiff must allege facts
demonstrating "that through personal or other relationships the
62
directors are beholden to the controlling person."
Subsequent Delaware case law reveals that prospective
litigants encounter a practical obstacle to mustering sufficient facts to

58. Up until that time, the case law was divided on whether, in the absence of fraud or selfdealing, demand should be excused when a majority of the board approved or acquiesced in the
challenged conduct. See Fischel, supra note 43, at 176-78; Underberg, supra note 22, at 606-07.
59. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
60. Id. at 814.
61. Id. at 815, 817-18. Whatever split of authority may have existed historically, see supra
note 58, over the 1980s, the rule would become firmly established that the board's approval or
acquiescence, or their status as defendants in the suit, did not suffice to excuse demand. In
addition to Aronson, see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.44(c)(2)-(3) (1990), which provides that
neither the naming of a director as defendant nor the approval by the director shall by itself
cause directors to be considered independent; Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248-49 (2d Cir.
1983), which holds that "absent specific allegations of self-dealing or bias on the part of a
majority of the board, mere approval and acquiescence are insufficient to render demand futile";
and Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 784-86 (3d Cir. 1982), which notes that "courts have refused
to excuse demand simply because a majority of the directors are named in the complaint" and
"[tihe majority view is that the mere approval of an allegedly injurious corporate transaction,
absent self-interest or bias by a majority of the board, is insufficient to excuse demand."
62. 473 A.2d at 815.
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satisfy Aronson's "particularity" requirement. Because
this
requirement applies when the complaint is filed, discovery is not
available. 63 Instead, the plaintiff must rely on the "tools at hand"SEC filings, media reports, and a possible books-and-records
inspection under section 220 of the Delaware law. 64 One Delaware
judge has noted the "almost impossible burden" that results when the
relevant facts are not a matter of public knowledge. 65
Thus, over a period of less than ten years, the demand
requirement was recast to pose a higher hurdle to derivative suits
alleging directors' breach of duty. While the power to entrust a
shareholder suit to an SLC, even under demand-excused
circumstances, was the era's truly new development, this modified
vision of demand's role in the cases that followed had more farreaching consequences for the relationship between courts and
corporate boards.
III. WHY?
The larger purpose of this Article is to assess, with the benefit
of twenty-five years of hindsight, where this more restrictive approach
to derivative litigation has led us. To do so, it is important to dig a
little deeper into the reasons for this development and to determine
whether those reasons still exist. The law's struggle with the sharply
competing costs and benefits of the derivative suit is decades old.
What was it about the mid-1970s that changed the balance?
Answering this question is an exercise in speculation. Little
within the courts' opinions acknowledges any larger economic or legal
developments that led to the shift. Indeed, critics voiced this
frustration at the time. 66 But this shift was likely something much
broader than a simple case of misguided formalism. 67 Responsibility
for making corporate law is dispersed among a variety of institutions
at the state and federal level-legislatures, courts, administrative
agencies, and private rulemaking bodies. Yet little of the inter63. Cf. Scattered Corp. v. Chi. Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70, 77 (Del. 1997); Levine v.
Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 208-09 (Del. 1991) (representing demand-refused cases, but also discussing
the non-availability of discovery in a demand-excused case).
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (Supp. 2006); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del.
1996); Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934-35 n.10 (Del. 1993).
65. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 268 (Del. 2000) (Hartnett, J., concurring). For a recent
discussion of whether Delaware's strict approach to the availability of discovery should apply in
federal courts, see Melzer v. CNET Networks, Inc., No. C 06-03817 WHA, 2006 WL 3716477, at
*3-4 (N.D. Cal. Dec 15, 2006).
66. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 17, at 262.
67. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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institutional tussle that usually accompanies shifts in the law was
present here. The new approach originated in federal court, ironically
one of the institutions that is traditionally most sympathetic to the
minority shareholder, 68 and with the exception of the lower court in
Maldonado, the state courts and legislatures not only quickly followed
suit, but also extended this enhanced business judgment deference to
69
independent directors in other contexts.
Identifiable legal and social forces during the 1970s likely
contributed to this change in approach. 70 One force was the public
perception that the United States had become excessively legalized
and litigious, with representative litigation, such as the class action,
singled out as a leading culprit. Another force was the fear that the
United States was entering an era of economic malaise, with lax
leadership within some of the nation's key industries contributing
significantly to the problem. Courts and shareholder suits play an
essential role in assuring managerial integrity, but not so much in
assuring managerial performance. If, consistent with the monitoring
model, stronger and more independent boards were the solution to the
latter problem, at least some policymakers may have seen enhanced
board autonomy and greater freedom from judicial oversight as an
important complement.
Perhaps these forces provide a sufficient explanation. But other
factors-more specific to the derivative suit and the duties it seeks to
enforce-likely contributed as well. Importantly, almost all of these
explanations relate to the particular issues raised by the Corporate
Impropriety suits, rather than by the Closely Held and Exploitation of
Control suits.
A. The Corporation'sBest Interest
Analytically, Gall and the other SLC cases established two
separate propositions: (1) the criteria for dismissing a derivative suit
include a determination that the suit is not in the best interest of the
corporation and its shareholders, and (2) an SLC is entitled to make
that determination on the corporation's behalf, protected by the
business judgment rule. The result, as some have observed, is that the

68. See, e.g., Daniel J. Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 8488 (1967).
69. See Kenneth B. Davis Jr., Rethinking the Derivative Suit 15-22 (April 2007)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Vanderbilt Law Review) (discussing enhancement of
business judgment deference in the context of special litigation committees).
70. For a more comprehensive discussion of the role played by these forces, see id.

402

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:2:387

SLC nearly always recommends dismissal. 7 1 Most of the commentary
assumes that the culprit is proposition 2 and in response argues that
the SLC's "structural bias" should negate the business judgment rule's
applicability. 72 In truth, though, proposition 1 is at least as important
as proposition 2, particularly in light of the post-Gall developments
discussed below.
This focus on proposition 1 suggests why the foreign payments
cases invited rethinking of the derivative suit's overall value. These
cases highlighted the potential for rift between legal merit-the
recognized province of the courts-and the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders. Most obvious was the risk to the
corporation's reputation and business prospects from exposing
previously secretive foreign dealings to the discovery process and the
publicity of litigation. Further, the prospects for any meaningful
monetary recovery were quite small. A claim against those responsible
for the payment might survive a motion to dismiss, 73 at least as to
recovery of the amount paid. 74 But the amount paid is usually trivial
compared to the corporation's overall assets. And even that amount
might be limited by the "net loss" rule, to the extent that profitable
business results from the payment. 75 Only in special circumstances
would there be an overall loss that was both quantifiable and
significant. 76 Indeed, reported recoveries were, on the whole, minor for

71. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative
Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1791 n.147 (2004); James D. Cox, Searching for the
Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation:A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982
DUKE L.J. 959, 963.
72. See generally Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees,
and the Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305 (2005); Julian Velasco,
StructuralBias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821 (2004) (proposing a
standard of "moderate review of the merits of directors' decisions" in cases involving structural
bias).
73. For a survey of the available legal theories and applicable defenses, see John C. Coffee,
Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an
Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1161-1241 (1977).
74. The classic case is Roth v. Robertson, 118 N.Y.S. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1909), holding the
manager of an amusement park liable for hush money paid to allow the park to operate on
Sundays, its busiest day of the week. For discussions of the continuing vitality of the Roth
doctrine, see Coffee, supra note 73, at 1167-69; Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Discretion of Corporate
Management to Do Good at the Expense of ShareholderGain-A Survey of, and Commentary on,
the U.S. CorporateLaw, 13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 7, 52-56 (1988).
75. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.18(c)
cmt.e (1992) (discussing the "net loss" rule); Coffee, supra note 73, at 1213-22 (detailing the
proximate cause defense and the net loss rule).
76. See, e.g., In re Gen. Tire & Rubber Co. Sec. Litig., 726 F.2d 1075, 1080 (6th Cir. 1984)
($100 million estimated loss from forfeiture of television licenses).
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cases that settled. 77 The deterrence argument likewise is attenuated.
New laws already had been enacted to address the specific conduct at
issue, 78 so derivative suits contributed little to preventing a
recurrence. And more generalized notions of deterrence had to account
for the reality that the conduct being challenged entailed79 senior
executives risking their careers for the benefit of shareholders.
B. Compensation and the Duty of Care
The preceding discussion prompts an obvious question: why did
judicial deference extend from the foreign payments context to other
areas? No doubt, some of the opposition to derivative suits related to
the personal risk exposure facing individual directors for what might
be deemed a lapse of judgment or failure of oversight years after the
fact. Of course, state exculpatory statutes directly addressed this
concern a decade later.80 Nonetheless, the speed with which those
statutes were enacted across the country in the wake of Smith v. Van
Gorkom suggests that the underlying sentiment was widely felt and
81
longstanding.
Corporate lawyers long have agreed that, in practice, the risk
of personal liability for negligence was remote. Directors could take
comfort in Professor Bishop's oft-quoted observation that finding cases
in which directors were held liable for negligence in the absence of
self-dealing was a "search for a very small number of needles in a very
large haystack."8 2 For a large U.S. corporation, however, the economic
consequences of the typical board level decision could be so substantial

77. In his study of shareholder suits between 1970 and 1978, Jones identified only one
questionable-payments derivative suit that yielded a monetary recovery to the corporation in
excess of $1 million-the $3.36 million settlement in the Gulf Oil case. Thomas M. Jones, An
Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits,
60 B.U. L. REV. 542, 548-51 (1980). This is in comparison to Gulfs 1974 assets of $12.5 billion
and gross revenues of $18.2 billion. JOHN J. MCCLOY ET AL., THE GREAT OIL SPILL 2 (1976).
78. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78-78n).
79. Walter Werner wrote an interesting essay at the time, observing how the conduct of
people like deposed Gulf Oil Corp. CEO Bob R. Dorsey seemed to belie the established Berle-andMeans thesis about the separation of ownership and control. Walter Werner, Management, Stock
Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 388, 388-90
(1977).
80.

See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)

(2001).
81. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
82. Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of CorporateDirectorsand Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099-1101 (1968).
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that even a remote risk was unacceptable.8 3 As the teachings of
economics played a greater role in the analysis of corporate law during
the 1970s, the problem was reframed in terms of risk allocation. The
corporation might find it less costly to pass the risk of unfortunate
decisions by its senior management to its shareholders, who can
diversify their portfolio holdings, than to impose the burden on its
risk-averse managers, who will insist on higher compensation in
return.8 4 The securities markets then could perform the task of pricing
the resulting arrangement to compensate shareholders for the risk
they bear. Thus, in the years leading up to Van Gorkom, proposals to
eliminate or reduce the directors' liability for negligence appeared
85
with increasing frequency in the corporate law literature.
The exculpatory statutes and enhanced judicial deference to
independent directors have combined to marginalize the derivative
suit for cases not involving self-dealing or other palpable breaches of
the duty of loyalty. In suits challenging the board's oversight, the
protection afforded by statutes makes it more difficult to excuse
demand on the basis that the directors are the alleged wrongdoers. 86
Also, when assessing whether the suit is in the corporation's best
interest, the board or the SLC can disregard the prospect of monetary
recovery for conduct falling within the exculpatory provisions.8 7 This is
most significant for those corporations, such as financial institutions,
where at least an argument for due care liability existed pre-statute. A
notable illustration is Joy v. North, where, under the second step of
the Zapata test, the court rejected the SLC's recommendation for a
Connecticut bank to discontinue a derivative suit challenging a series
83. For a pre-Gall argument to limit the director's liability in response to these kinds of
concerns, see Alfred F. Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors'Liability for Negligence, 1972
DUKE L.J. 895.
84. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[S]hareholders to a very real
degree voluntarily undertake the risk of bad business judgment."); Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation
Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 936
(1983) ("Bad luck is inherent in the nature of an uncertain world, and its risk is better borne by
stockholders. They can diversify against this risk to a greater extent than can directors or
managers whose human capital is concentrated in the firm.").
85. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 17, at 316-18; Conard, supra note 83; Scott, supra note
84, at 932-37; Elliot J. Weiss, Economic Analysis, Corporate Law, and the ALI Corporate
GovernanceProject, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13-17 (1984).
86. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 501-02 (Del. Ch. 2003) (asserting that in the
event that the charter insulates directors from liability for breaches of duty of care, a serious
threat of liability may only be found to exist if the plaintiff pleads a non-exculpated claim against
directors with particularized facts); In re Baxter Int'l, Inc. S'holders Litig., 654 A.2d 1268, 127071 (Del. Ch. 1995) (same).
87. Indeed, that determination now derives legitimacy from the facts that the shareholders
themselves, whose approval is required by most of the statutes, concluded that exculpation is in
their best interest.
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of risky loans to a developer.88 In the court's view, termination was
improper given "the probability of a substantial net return" to the
corporation from the suit. 89 The court might well reach a different
outcome today in view of Connecticut's 1990 amendment to its
banking laws permitting limitation of directors' liability.9 0
In terms of our three-part categorization scheme, the collective
effects of these impediments to recovery for due care violations show
up chiefly in the Corporate Impropriety cases, where the predominant
theory of liability is failure of oversight. Very few of the cases
discussed in Section IV.B reveal any significant monetary recovery.
This does not imply that the combined effects of the exculpatory
statutes and the more restrictive approach to demand were
unintended, or even undesirable. A principal reason for the statutes
was to address the concern that highly qualified individuals were
refusing to serve on boards due to the threat of personal liability. With
the board's oversight function in particular, the ensuing case law
suggests a potentially slippery slope from "gross negligence" to
"conscious disregard" to "bad faith." 91 Incumbent and prospective
directors therefore may regard the issue of who interprets and applies
the exculpatory statutes (court or board committee) as the heart of the
matter.
In any event, with the enactment of the exculpatory statutes, a
highly visible component of the derivative suit's compensation
function officially was removed. While the right of recovery for
breakdowns in judgment or oversight may have been more theoretical
than real, it no longer exists even in theory. As a result, justification
for the derivative suit must rely increasingly on the suit's deterrent
role, which, as discussed in Section III.D.2, presents problems of its
own.

88.
89.

692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 894-97.

90.

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-97 (West 2007).

91. See, e.g., In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 809-11 (7th Cir.
2003) (citing McCall); McCall v. Scott, 250 F.3d 997, 999-1001 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that,
where the duty of care claims arose from the board's unconscious failure to act, with a Certificate
of Incorporation which exempts the directors from personal liability, "a conscious disregard of
known risks , . . if proven, cannot have been undertaken in good faith[; thus,] . . . plaintiffs'

claims are not precluded by [the companyl's § 102(b)(7) waiver provision"). The Delaware
Supreme Court, however, has made significant efforts to bring clarity to these issues in recent
years. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d
27, 62-67 (Del. 2006). But as the recent decision, In re SFBC Int'l., Inc. Sec. & Derivative Litig.,
No. 06-165 (SRC), 2007 WL 2127213, at *5-*9 (D.N.J. Jul 25, 2007), reveals, the existence of a
sufficient number of "red flags" may still suffice to get the plaintiffs past the demand
requirement.
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C. Spilling over into the Duty of Loyalty
In the wake of the foreign payments cases, some saw the
Delaware Chancery Court's opinion in Maldonado as a signal that
courts would take a tougher stance in cases involving self-dealing or
92
other personal gain-the traditional core of derivative litigation.
While the Delaware Supreme Court's reversal of that decision on
appeal dampened this hope, many still saw the care-loyalty distinction
as the place to draw a line.9 3 For example, the ALI prohibited
termination of any derivative suit alleging self-dealing by a controlling
person in its first draft of the Principlesof Corporate Governance94-a
limitation that tracks the Exploitation of Control category. This
prohibition was trimmed back over time and, as adopted, dealt only
with terminations that would allow certain defendants to retain a
95
significant improper benefit.
On the whole, however, so long as the independence
presumptions of the business judgment rule have not been rebutted,
courts generally have extended as much deference to the board or the
SLC in duty of loyalty cases as in duty of care cases. In this situation,
answering the "why" question becomes most speculative. Certainly, no
explanation is directly comparable to the risk allocation rationale that
was observed with the duty of care. No theoretical or commonsense
case can be made that senior management should be able to line its
pockets because it is easier for the shareholders to bear the resulting
loss.
But the reality is more subtle. Often, an officer, director, or
controlling shareholder will be the sole or most qualified source for a
good or service of value to the corporation. Compensation
relationships with senior management are the obvious example. Were
there bright line tests to filter the beneficial self-dealing transactions
from the abusive, the courts' job would be straightforward. Instead,
courts are required to work with indeterminate criteria such as "good
faith" and "entire fairness." 96 Referring the decision back to the
92. Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 688 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Coffee & Schwartz,
supra note 17, at 276-77.
93. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 84, at 944-46 (discussing the roles of the duty of loyalty and
duty of care).
94. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE, supra note 27, § 7.03(c)(iii).
95.

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.10(b)

(1992).
96. Much has been written in recent years on the indeterminate nature of corporate law,
with a particular focus on Delaware. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations
of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1760-62 (2006) (discussing recent
scholarship focusing on Delaware corporate law); Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under
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corporation's independent directors, therefore, becomes an inviting
institutional alternative.
As a practical matter, three separate lines of judicial inquiry
underlie the fairness test. The first two are the familiar fair dealing
and fair price inquiries set forth by the Delaware Supreme Court in
Weinberger.97 The fair dealing inquiry fits easily within the court's
core competence. If material information is concealed, established
corporate practices are not followed, or other process flaws exist, the
court can set aside the transaction without having to determine
whether a hypothetical arm's length decisionmaker would have
approved it. Likewise, courts have established tools to perform the fair
price inquiry, especially if comparables are available. But many selfdealing transactions are, by their nature, unique.
The court's
resulting quandary is captured by the following passage from a law
school casebook coauthored by a former Delaware chancellor:
Where the existing precedents leave room for discretionary judgments, the Chancery
judges-who, of course, are the ones who must make the actual valuations of "fair
prices"-seem more willing to defer to substitute process if it seems to have integrity.
These judges understand from practice that valuation decisions are often impossible to
make with confidence ....Gross disparities
can be detected with some confidence, but
98
subtle ones are impossible to detect.

The third line of inquiry can be labeled "business purpose"the very test the court rejected in Weinberger.99 That rejection
notwithstanding, it is difficult to imagine, at least as a conceptual
matter, how to evaluate whether a conflicted transaction is fair to the
corporation and its shareholders without asking: fairness of the terms
aside, is this something that an independent decisionmaker would
have done? And answering that question typically will entail even
greater indeterminacy than the other components. Consider, by way of
illustration, two of the most prominent duty of loyalty suits of the era
in which the restrictive approach to demand developed: (1) Zapata
Corp.'s acceleration of the exercise date of stock options held by its
CEO and other senior executives, which formed the basis of the

Indeterminate Corporate Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 887 (1999) (discussing corporate decision.
making in an environment of legal uncertainty); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory
of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998) (detailing Delaware's
domination of the interstate competition in providing corporate law and the indeterminacy of its
laws that contributes to its judicial advantage).
97. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
98. Note on Cooke v. Oolie and the Delaware Supreme Court, in WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL.,
COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 321 (2d ed. 2007).

99. In Weinberger, the court overruled the business-purpose requirement that it had
imposed on parent-subsidiary mergers only a few years earlier in Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380
A.2d 980 (Del. 1977). Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715.
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landmark Delaware decision and parallel cases in two federal
courts; 100 and (2) Ford Motor Co.'s payment of the monthly
maintenance fees on a Manhattan co-op apartment owned by its
chairman, Henry Ford II.101 In each case-as with any fringe benefitthe insiders profited and the shareholders paid the price. 10 2 But who
can say with confidence that an arm's length employer would not have
done the same? Had either of these suits gone to trial, the nagging
question is what point of reference could the court have used to assess
whether the board breached its fiduciary duty?
As these cases also illustrate, and as many on all sides of the
debate over derivative suits' value have acknowledged,10 3 the
compensation element in many kinds of duty of loyalty cases,
particularly those falling into the Corporate Impropriety category, is
often trivial. 10 4 Suit nonetheless can be justified from a traditional
fiduciary perspective by the deterrent effect of requiring the selfdealing executives to disgorge their ill-gotten gains unless they can
prove the entire fairness of their conduct. But so long as it is plausible,
though inevitably uncertain, that an independent decisionmaker may
have conferred the same benefit, is it appropriate to brand the
executives as miscreants simply because they cannot remove that
uncertainty?10 5 When derivative litigation's expense and potential for
100. In all, there were eleven reported decisions. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review
of Fiduciary Decision Making-Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 74 n.246
(1985).
101. See ROBERT LACEY, FORD: THE MEN AND THE MACHINE 620-26 (1986); Ford Chairman
Accused of Nepotism in ShareholderSuit, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1978, at 21.
102. In the Zapata cases, the benefit was two-fold: By allowing the executives to exercise
their options in advance of the company's tender offer announcement, the acceleration reduced
their income taxes, with a corresponding decrease in the company's tax deductions. Also, the
company granted the executives interest-free loans to cover the tax burden. Maher v. Zapata
Corp., 714 F.2d 436, 439-42 (5th Cir. 1983).
103. See, e.g., James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3,
16 (1999) ("Tying the measure of the shareholder suit's social value to its compensatory functions
most certainly will condemn it to failure."); Bryant G. Garth et al., Empirical Research and the
Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Toward a Better Informed Debate, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1985, at 137, 139 (referencing "illusory or de minimis compensation").
104. In the Zapata Corp. stock option cases, the cost of the tax benefit to the company was
equivalent to about one cent per share. See Davis, supra note 100, at 75. In the case of Ford,
Henry Ford ultimately reimbursed the company $34,585, mostly for personal use of the co-op by
his estranged wife and her friends, which had occurred without his knowledge. LACEY, supra
note 101, at 649; Leonard P. Apcar, Ford Discloses ChairmanRepaid Firm After Audit, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 13, 1979, at 4.
105. While purely a matter of conjecture, it seems at least plausible that the Delaware
courts' increasing recognition of the non-workability of the business-purpose test in the merger
context, see supra note 99, at about the same time as the SLC and demand cases were being
decided, may have given rise to fresh doubts about the judicial ability to delineate, in other
contexts, what transactions were truly business motivated.
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abuse is added into the mix, 10 6 shareholders may be better off with a
less costly, even if fallible, process, such as remitting the issue to the
corporation's independent directors. The potential for some public and
judicial scrutiny of the independent directors' response, combined with
the other sources of deterrence discussed in the next subsection,
hopefully will keep the risk of managerial self-enrichment within
tolerable limits-eliminating the "gross disparities" in the words of the
passage quoted above. Admittedly, the independent board members
may evaluate their colleagues' conduct more favorably than would a
judge (the "structural bias" point 10 7). But if the residual risk of abuse
remains economically significant, shareholders can be compensated
for it in the price they pay for their shares. 0 8
There are limits to this kind of thinking. While the combination
of unavoidable self-dealing, small stakes, and legal indeterminacy
may justify deferring to the board on everyday loyalty issues, it is
more difficult to justify deference for significant transactions outside
the ordinary course, particularly when the board is subject to the
influence of a controlling shareholder. That is why the distinction
between the Corporate Impropriety and Exploitation of Control
categories is significant. From that perspective, the most significant
step in the case law was not Gall or Zapata but Aronson v. Lewis. 10 9 In
addition to the doctrine Aronson articulated, it also marked the first
extension of the restrictive approach to an Exploitation of Control
situation.110

106. In the Ford suit, for example, all the charges were ultimately dropped. The plaintiffs
attorneys nonetheless were paid $230,000 in fees, which was set aside five years later by a
federal court in a separate action. LACEY, supra note 101, at 621-24; Iver Peterson, Suit Naming
Henry Ford Is Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1980, at 27; Cohn, Another Lawyer Are Ordered to
Repay Ford Motor $230,000, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1985; Fee Ruling on Ford Suit, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 1985, at D13.
107. See supra note 72 (discussing commentary that suggests that an SLC's "structural bias"
should negate the business judgment rule's applicability).
108. See Davis, supra note 100, at 71-75 (discussing how shareholders "can adjust ex ante by
reducing what they pay for their shares").
109. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
110. At issue was an "employment agreement" between the corporation and Leo Fink, its
forty-seven percent shareholder, who was seventy-five years old at the time of the agreement.
Under the terms of the agreement, which were automatically renewable after five years, Fink
was to be paid $150,000 annually plus a bonus if the corporation's profits exceeded $2.4 million.
The $150,000 was equivalent to eighteen percent of the corporation's profits at the time. See
Meyers Parking System Reports Earnings for Qtr to Dec 31, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1982, at D19
(detailing revenues of the company). If the agreement was terminated, Fink was to become a
consultant, initially at the same level of pay. In excusing demand, the lower court had
emphasized that Fink's compensation under the agreement was to be unaffected by his ability to
provide any services. Lewis v. Aronson, 466 A.2d at 383-84, rev'd, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that no reasonable doubt was created as to the application
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Other courts appear more sensitive to the unique context of
Exploitation of Control suits. In fact, the two principal post-Zapata
decisions that rejected the deferential approach both fell into this
category. Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc. involved a
challenge to the corporation's sale of stock to directors and other key
employees for what the plaintiff alleged was grossly inadequate
consideration.1 1 ' The sales were part of a larger plan to preserve
control of the corporation in the hands of the founding Cowles
family. 112 The Iowa Supreme Court ruled that when a majority of the
directors are defendants, the board cannot empower an SLC to bind
the corporation to terminating the derivative suit." a And in Alford v.
Shaw, the plaintiffs had alleged that the "Shaw group," the majority
and controlling shareholder of All American Assurance Company
("AAA"), was responsible for a pattern of self-dealing and looting the
corporation's assets. 1 4 Both the North Carolina Court of Appeals1'5
and Supreme Court 1 6 held that the business judgment rule did not
17
shield the SLC's determination from judicial scrutiny."

of the business judgment rule. Following remand, the complaint was amended to add allegations
that Fink resided in Florida, while the corporate offices were in New York, and that he was
receiving double compensation. The Court of Chancery again excused demand. Lewis v. Aronson,
No. 6919, 1985 WL 11553 (Del. Ch., May 1, 1985). Fink continued to serve as the corporation's
chairman until his death at age 84. See Obituary: Leo Fink, 84, Philanthropistand Executive,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1988, at B22.
111. 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983).
112. See Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311, 1315-16 (S.D. Iowa
1981); WILLIAM B. FRIEDRICKS, COVERING IOWA: THE HISTORY OF THE DES MOINES REGISTER AND
TRIBUNE COMPANY, 1849-1985, at 82-83 (2000).
113. 336 N.W.2d at 715-18.
114. According to the Supreme Court this included:
failing to exercise an option to purchase shares of AAA stock from Great
Commonwealth Life Insurance Company (GCL) and failing to exercise a "put" to sell
shares of AAA stock to American Commonwealth Financial Corporation (ACFC);
paying excessive amounts to affiliated companies for administrative expenses;
entering into certain allegedly improper reinsurance and coinsurance agreements;
redeeming certain 8% debentures held by affiliated companies; releasing American
Bank and Trust Company (ABTC) of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, from an obligation to
purchase an office building; and engaging in other allegedly improper transactions
with affiliates, including unsecured loans and joint ownership of airplanes.
Alford v. Shaw, 349 S.E.2d 41, 44 (N.C. 1986), withdrawn, 358 S.E.2d 323 (N.C. 1987).
115. Alford v. Shaw, 324 S.E.2d 878 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985), rev'd, 349 S.E.2d 41 (N.C. 1986),
withdrawn, 358 S.E.2d 323 (N.C. 1987).
116. Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 328 (N.C. 1987).
117. Following remand, the trial court approved the parties' settlement of some issues but
otherwise accepted the recommendations of the SLC, a decision that was upheld on appeal. See
Alford v. Shaw, 398 S.E.2d 445, 447, 452-60 (N.C. 1990) (reviewing trial court evaluations of
SLC).
117. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.44(a)-(b) (1984); see IOWA CODE § 490.744(1)-(2) (2007)
(adopting deferential MBCA approach); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-44(a)-(b) (2007) (adopting same).
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Neither decision is the controlling law. Both Iowa and North
Carolina have adopted the Model Business Corporation Act ('"MBCA")
provisions requiring the court to defer to the recommendation of the
board or the SLC. 118 The legal process dimensions of this development
are consistent with the theory that the courts' more restrictive
approach to derivative suits stems from a stereotype associated with
the Corporate Impropriety cases. While courts confront the facts of the
case before them, legislators are affected more by general public
opinion.
D. The Growth of Alternatives
Two descriptions of the derivative suit were cited regularly
over the years. One is the Supreme Court's 1949 statement in Cohen
v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. that the derivative suit "was long
the chief regulator of corporate management."'1 9 Ten years later,
Eugene Rostow characterized derivative litigation as "the most
important procedure the law has yet developed to police the internal
affairs of corporations."1 20 Read today, both statements seem
timeworn. By the late 1960s, a number of institutional developments
began to supplement and supplant the derivative suit with respect to
both of its recognized roles-compensation and deterrence. The
availability of alternatives surely contributed to the courts'
willingness to entrust greater control of the derivative suit to the
corporation's independent directors. In turn, the resulting limitation
on the shareholder's access to the courts likely contributed to the
further growth and expansion of some of these institutional
alternatives.
1. Compensation
Many observers question whether derivative suits perform a
meaningful compensatory function. 121 In a 1991 study, Professor
Roberta Romano evaluated shareholder suits against 535 present and
former NYSE and NASDAQ National Market firms from the late

118. IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.744(2); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-7-44(a) (West 2007).
119. 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
120. Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends are Corporate Management
Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 48 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1960).
121. In addition to the studies discussed in the text, see Daniel R. Fischel & Michael
Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and
EmpiricalAnalysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 277-83 (1986) (suggesting that the positive wealth
effects of allowing a derivative suit to proceed are, at most, slight).
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1960s through 1987.122 Only twenty-one percent of the derivative suits
that she identified resulted in "cash payouts to shareholders," and the
average suit amount was $6 million, equivalent to 0.5 percent of the
corporation's assets or eighteen cents per share.123 Because most of the
suits in her sample predated the enactment of the exculpatory
statutes, 124 recoveries may be even lower today. In their study of
Delaware derivative suits filed in 1999 and 2000, Professors Robert
Thompson and Randall Thomas found that of fifty lead cases resolved,
only six resulted in monetary recovery. 125 Even when monetary
recovery is obtained on behalf of the corporation, a circularity problem
arises when, as is often the case, the corporation's D&O insurer pays
the recovery. Increases to the corporation's premium rates may offset
26
a substantial portion of the recovery.1
The dismissal of the derivative suit's compensation function
may be yet another byproduct of the tendency to think principally in
terms of large cap corporations. The prospect of substantial monetary
recovery may depend heavily on the category of case at issue. Of the
six cases that produced a monetary recovery in the Thompson and
Thomas study, four appear to fit the Exploitation of Control
category. 127 In a similar vain, a recent study by Professors Bernard
Black, Brian Cheffins, and Michael Klausner identified only six
derivative suits against outside directors of public companies that had
gone to trial from 1985 through 2000.128 The only two cases won by
129
plaintiffs were again Exploitation of Control cases.
For Corporate Impropriety cases, on the other hand, the
evidence suggests that securities and other class actions now perform
many of the functions previously associated with the derivative suit. A

122. Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?,7 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 55, 61-62 (1991).
123. Id. at 61-62.
124. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
125. Thompson & Thomas, supranote 71, at 1775-76.
126. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering
Between Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 789, 805-06 (1984) (discussing circularity
problem of corporations funding their own recovery and noting that premium rate increases may
shelter managers).
127. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 71, at 1776-78, 1777 tbl.13A. Likewise, all three of the
large settlements Thompson and Thomas identify as producing monetary relief for non-publiclytraded entities appear to have Exploitation of Control characteristics with owners claiming
against corporate managers. Id. at 1777-78, 1778 tbl.13B.
128. Bernard Black et al., Outside DirectorLiability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1155 (2006).
129. See id. at 1156 tbl.B3 (noting two suits won against outside directors of public
companies).
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starting point is the sheer number of filings and size of recoveries. 130
Over the last ten to fifteen years, securities class actions have been
filed against publicly traded companies at a rate of roughly 250 per
year. 131 Median settlements have been in the $6 to $7 million range.
This compares to the roughly fifty suits per year brought against
publicly traded companies in the Delaware state courts in 19992000.132 Even more dramatic is the rise of the state law class action
challenging the directors' conduct in connection with a merger or
acquisition transaction. The Thompson and Thomas data show that
class action cases now outnumber derivative suits by several-fold in
133
Delaware.
A plausible inference is that because of Delaware's stricter
approach to demand and deference to SLCs, shareholders are relying
more on class actions to litigate the fiduciary-based claims that were
once the principal province of derivative litigation. Professors Robert
Thompson and Hilary Sale report that securities class actions
typically involve misrepresentations rooted in a failure by the
corporation's senior officers to perform their duty of care and their
oversight function-a traditional focus of state law1 34 that exculpatory
statutes have foreclosed.135 Along similar lines, in a study of
acquisition-related class actions, Professors Thompson and Thomas
found that a majority of the filings, and an even higher proportion of
the cases resulting in monetary relief, raised classic duty of loyalty
issues-a transaction with a controlling shareholder or incumbent

130. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS, 2006: A YEAR IN

REVIEW 1-3 (2007), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse-research/2006_YIR/
20070102-O1.pdf; TODD FOSTER ET AL., RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION: FILINGS PLUMMET, SETTLEMENTS SOAR 1-3 (2007), available at http://www.nera

.comlPublication.asp?pID=3028.
131. See FOSTER ET AL., supra note 130, at 2 (graphing total number of filings between 1991
and 2006).
132. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 71, at 1761-62. More than half these suits resulted in
no relief for the plaintiffs, and only six of fifty-seven complaints led to monetary recovery. Id. at
1775-77, 1775-77 tbls.12 & 13A.
133. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation:
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 168-69, 169 tbl.2 (2004). Among all
fiduciary duty complaints against public companies filed in Delaware in 1999-2000, Thompson
and Thomas identified 108 derivative suits filed against public entities compared to 765
acquisition-related class actions filed against public entities. Id. at 169 tbl.2. If the data are
confined to lead complaints, the numbers are fifty-six and 194, respectively. Id.
134. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 897-99, 904-05 (2003) (discussing
consequences of misrepresentation and federalization of claims traditionally seen in state
courts).
135. See supra Part III.B (discussing consequences of enacting exculpatory statutes).
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management. 136 Duty of loyalty issues figure less prominently in
securities class actions-parties invoke them most often to plead
scienter13 7-but they remain the mainstay of the derivative suit. 138
Today's derivative suit therefore may function mostly as the
repository for self-dealing and other duty of loyalty claims that neither
arise in an acquisition context nor involve substantial stock market
losses. That the overwhelming majority of the recent stock option
backdating cases have been filed as derivative suits 139 supports this
characterization.
Serious questions exist, however, regarding whether the
securities class action will continue to play as visible a role as it has in
the past. The number of new filings has dropped in recent years. 140
Further, the securities class action has become at least as much of an
anathema as the derivative suit once was. Although the last
comprehensive legislative efforts to trim class actions back is barely
ten years old,' 4 ' there are calls for another round. 142 Litigation reform
has been a theme in a series of recent reports addressing the threats
to the global competitiveness of U.S. capital markets. 143 Two years
136. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 133, at 138-39, 173-75, 175 tbl.5, 196 (discussing
nature of cases resulting in monetary relief). Indeed, class actions involving controlling
shareholder transactions and MBOs represent approximately half of all acquisition-related
complaints and approximately eighty-one percent of the cases resulting in additional monetary
consideration. See id. at 199-204, 199 tbl.17 (distinguishing form of relief in acquisition cases by
transaction type).
137. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 134, at 901, 908 (discussing the scienter element and
noting that duty of loyalty claims in class actions often serve as "hooks, not substantive claims").
138. See Thompson & Thomas, supranote 71, at 1772-74, 1772 tbl.11 (noting that "almost 60
percent of the complaints raise principally a duty of loyalty claim").
139. See infra notes 158-162 and accompanying text (discussing backdating cases filed as
derivative suits).
140. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 130, at 3-4; FOSTER ET AL., supra note 130, at 1-2.
After a dramatic decline in 2006, filings increased in 2007 (due largely to the subprime lending
crisis), but remain well below the average for the prior ten years. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS, 2007: A YEAR IN REVIEW 2-7 (2008), available at
http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/YIR2007.pdf; STEPHANIE PLANCICH ET AL., RECENT TRENDS
IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS: FILINGS RETURN TO 2005 LEVELS AS SUBPRIME CASES TAKE
OFF; AVERAGE SETTLEMENTS HIT NEW HIGH 1-2 (Dec. 2007), available at http://www.
nera.com/image/BRORecentTrends_12-07web3FINAL.pdf.
141. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2000)).
142. See H.R. 3931, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposing amendments to 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 that
would allow courts to impose fees and expenses of litigation on losing plaintiffs).
143. See MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE
US' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 73-78, 100-04 (2007), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/special-reports/2007/NY-REPORT
%20_FINAL.pdf (discussing threat of litigation and offering remedial recommendations); COMM.
ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 74-84 (2006), available at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/l1.30CommitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf (same); COMM'N ON
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ago, the Supreme Court opted for a restrictive approach to
establishing loss causation in securities fraud cases. 144 Last term, it
adopted a restrictive approach to pleading scienter, 145 and this term, it
146
rejected "scheme liability."
2. Deterrence
By the time Gall and the other SLC cases were decided, several
regulatory and enforcement mechanisms had evolved to challenge the
derivative suit's historical reputation as the "the chief regulator of
corporate management."' 4 7 Most visible was the SEC's enforcement
program. The SEC's civil injunctive actions soared from an eight-year
low of sixty-seven in 1966 to 178 in 1973.148 In August 1972, a
separate Division of Enforcement was created; it pursued highvisibility actions against Penn Central, 149 Robert Vesco, Equity
50
Funding, C. Arnholt Smith, and National Student Marketing Corp.
The threat of criminal prosecution also had a greater role in the
corporate arena. The 1970s and early 1980s have been described as
the "heyday" for focusing on white collar crime at the federal level, as
its share of total prosecutions more than doubled in less than a
decade.151
How effective are these alternative sources of deterrence today?
Certainly, the priority given various enforcement and prosecution
initiatives will ebb and flow, as scandals such as Enron burst into the

THE

REGULATION

OF

U.S.

CAPITAL

MARKETS

IN

THE

21ST

CENTURY,

REPORT

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS 28-31 (2007), available at http://www.capitalmarketscommission.com/portal/
capmarkets/default.htm (select "Download the full report") (same).
144. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-45 (2005) (rejecting Ninth Circuit
loss-causation standard that allowed plaintiffs to show only that the price of a security on the
purchase date was inflated because of misrepresentations).
145. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504-05 (2007) ("[A]n
inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable-it must be cogent and at
least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfradulent intent.").
146. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., No. 06-43, 2008 WL 123801
(U.S. Jan. 15, 2008).
147. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
148. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 39TH ANNUAL REPORT 170 tbl.26 (1973), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/annual-report/1973.pdf.
149. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 38TH ANNUAL REPORT 17-18 (1972), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/annual-report/1972.pdf.
150. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 148, at 21-24, 80-81, 84-85.
151. JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., WHITE COLLAR CRIME: LAW AND PRACTICE 24 (1996) (quoting
1986 testimony from the Deputy Attorney General). For a discussion of the reasons for this
enhanced reliance on criminal prosecutions during the 1970s, see Jack Katz, The Social
Movement Against White-Collar Crime, 2 CRIMINOLOGY REV. Y.B. 161 (Egon Bittner & Sheldon
L. Messinger eds., 1980).
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public consciousness, then fade from memory. Whatever the climate at
the time, the criminal or administrative sanction is rooted in the
corporate consciousness as a viable deterrent to serious wrongdoing.
Even in the absence of formal sanction, the stigma of corporate
misconduct now looms larger than ever for those, such as outside
directors, whose career opportunities are dependent on their business
reputation and public image. The case of Enron's directors makes this
dramatically clear. 152 And the enhanced coverage of business and
financial news make it unlikely that any newsworthy misdeed will go
unreported.
The recent disclosures of stock option backdating afford a
unique cross-company insight into the relative prevalence of these
various sources of deterrence in the contemporary legal climate. The
Wall Street Journal maintained and regularly updated an "Options
Scorecard" of "companies that have come under scrutiny for past stock
option grants and practices." 153 As of August 1, 2007, the list included
141 companies that had disclosed misdated options, governmental
investigations, accounting restatements, or the departure of senior
executives. 154 Of these, 105 had been contacted by the SEC and fiftyfour had received subpoenas from the Justice Department. What role
has private litigation played in comparison? A blog entitled "The D&O
Diary" maintains an up-to-date listing of the relevant suits. 155 As of
August 1, 2007, it identified 160 companies that were the subject of

152. See Gretchen Morgenson, Sticky Scandals, Teflon Directors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006,
at Cl (describing stigmatizing effect of facing trial on Enron executives); Anil Shivdasani,
Damaged Directors, Non-Executive Directorsof Companies Accused of Fraud Quickly Find Their
Reputation Under Scrutiny. Is This the Result of Legislation or Market Forces?, FIN. TIMES, June
2, 2006, pt. 2, at 2 (positing that the "appearance of impropriety" may be enough to ruin a
business career). Empirical research on the issue of reputational sanctions facing outside
directors is now beginning to appear and confirm these impressions. See Eliezer M. Fich & Anil
Shivdasani, FinancialFraud,DirectorReputation,and Shareholder Wealth, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 306
(2007) (investigating reputational impact of fraud investigations); Suraj Srinivasan,
Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors: Evidence from Accounting
Restatements and Audit Committee Members, 43 J. ACCT. RES. 291, 291-92 (2005) (examining
significant labor market penalties for outside directors).
153. Wall Street Journal, Options Scorecard, http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/
documents/info-optionsscore06-full.html (last updated Sept. 4, 2007).
154. Id. The site noted that the list contains "[s]ome companies that have undertaken or
disclosed internal probes but no further news may not be included." Id.
155. Counting the Options Backdating Lawsuits, D & 0 DIARY, July 20, 2006,
http://dandodiary.blogspot.com/2006/07/counting-options-backdating-lawsuits.html (last updated
Feb. 9, 2008).
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derivative suits, twenty-nine of which were also the subject of
156
securities class actions and five of ERISA actions.
These numbers are consistent with the critique that derivative
suits simply piggyback on what the government (or perhaps even the
media) already has uncovered and investigated. 1 57 As a result, the
derivative suit can contribute to deterrence only when either the
private plaintiff follows through with litigation that the governmental
agency lacks the resources or willingness to continue, or when the
plaintiff can obtain relief not available to the government. 158 Too often,
however, the economic pressures facing the plaintiffs attorney,
coupled with the defendant's access to indemnification and insurance,
leads to a quick and non-pecuniary settlement that supports the
award of attorneys fees but imposes little, if any, monetary cost on the
59
individual defendant.
A separate challenge to evaluating the marginal deterrence
created by the derivative suit is that deterrence often will vary with
the beholder. A recent article on class actions comments that
"[e]xecutives tempted to lie about earnings are more concerned about
[plaintiffs attorneys] Bill Lerach and Melvyn Weiss than they are
about the Securities and Exchange Commission."'160 This is a
provocative comment; many onlookers might argue exactly the
opposite. Consider, for example, former SEC Commissioner Joe
Grundfest's recent observation that the explanation for the recent
sharp decline of securities class actions might be simply that there is

156. Id. Two companies (PainCare Holdings, Inc. and Wireless Facilities, Inc.) were the
subject of securities class actions, but not derivative suits. Id. Neither of these was on the Wall
Street Journal list. Options Scorecard, supra note 153.
157. In virtually none of the cases is there any indication that the plaintiffs attorney
unearthed the violation. Typically, detection of potentially improper backdating was the product
of a governmental inquiry, internal corporate investigation, or research by a securities analyst.
This "piggyback" aspect is not limited to the derivative suit, but characterizes other forms of
representative litigation, as well. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General:
Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 220-22, 222
n. 16 (1983) (collecting examples of private litigation piggybacking off government prosecution).
158. For a general review of the advantages and disadvantages of private litigation as a
supplement to public enforcement, see Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private
Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93,
106-20 (2005).
159. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in
Shareholder Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 23-33 (discussing
pressures to settle cases and noting significant examples); Romano, supra note 122, at 63-65
(noting that data "make[s] plain that the principal beneficiaries of cash payouts in shareholder
suits are attorneys").
160. Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the ClassAction Agency Costs Myth: The
Social Utility of EntrepreneurialLawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 106 (2006).
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now less fraud, due to aggressive SEC and Justice Department
161
enforcement in the wake of Enron and WorldCom.
Notwithstanding this challenge to assessing the derivative
suit's incremental contribution to deterrence, circumstances are
identifiable where that contribution is likely to be greatest. Sections
IV.A through IV.C confirm that these factors are prevalent in the
Closely Held and Exploitation of Control cases. Misconduct at smaller
companies, whose shares are traded less actively, will be more likely
to escape the awareness and the interest of governmental agencies
and the media. Further, many shareholders at these companies will be
closer to corporate affairs than their counterparts at more widely
traded companies, so that litigation will be client driven more
frequently than lawyer driven. Second, cases seeking the return of a
substantial personal benefit pose a greater threat of personal loss to
individual defendants, which will not be covered by indemnification or
insurance.

IV. A THREE-CATEGORY TYPOLOGY OF DERIVATIVE SUITS
To understand the role of derivative litigation today, this study
collects reported decisions in suits asserting derivative claims against
Delaware corporations during the current decade (2000 through the
first quarter of 2007). "Derivative claims" include both claims pleaded
as derivative claims and claims pleaded as direct claims but adjudged
to be derivative. In all, the study identifies 294 separate cases. 162
Multiple opinions in the same case or in separate cases that
subsequently were consolidated are treated as a single case for
purposes of the study. Of the 294 cases, 121 were in Delaware state
court and 173 were in federal court.
As noted in the Introduction, the three-category typology that
emerges questions the wisdom of the conventional public/private
dichotomy in understanding the derivative suit's role. The Closely
Held category includes corporations, limited liability companies, and
limited liability partnerships in which equity participation is confined
to a relatively small number of active participants, capital suppliers,
161. Joseph A. Grundfest, Editorial Commentary, The Class-Action Market, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 7, 2007, at A15.
162. The cases were identified based on searches using the term "derivative" in the Lexis-

Nexis "DECTS" and the Westlaw "DEBUS" and "DE-CS" databases, and the string "derivative
and Delaware" in the Westlaw "ALLFEDS" database. No effort was made to include derivative
suits involving Delaware corporations that were decided in other state courts. All opinions dated
between January 1, 2000, and March 31, 2007, were reviewed. In all, more than 2100 separate
opinions were screened to yield the 294 for this study. Case list is on file with Vanderbilt Law
Review.
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family members, and employees. The other two categories consist of
widely held firms. At issue in the Corporate Impropriety cases is the
directors' responsibility for some wrongful act at the corporate leveltypically a violation of law or a regulatory requirement. The
Exploitation of Control category involves corporate transactions with,
or on behalf of, the persons who control it. For cases in this category,
the corporations tend to be smaller, the plaintiffs tend to hold
significant blocks of stock, and the stock tends to be thinly traded,
especially compared to that of the corporations in the Corporate
Impropriety category. Table 1 indicates the breakdown of suits among
categories. As it reveals, the Corporate Impropriety cases tend to be
brought in federal court, likely due in part to the exclusive federal
jurisdiction over claims to enforce the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, while the Exploitation of Control cases tend to be brought in
Delaware state court. The Closely Held cases are more evenly divided.
Table 1. Total Cases

Closely Held

Corporate
Impropriety

Exploitation
of Control

Federal Court
Delaware State Court

32
26

109
43

32
52

Total

58

152

84

It is worth emphasizing that the cases were not collected with
the intention of fitting them into these categories. Rather, the
objective was to evaluate cases involving publicly traded corporations
on a variety of grounds. But the pattern became apparent when the
first group of cases was being evaluated, and it held with the
extension of the study to the full 7.25-year period. Questions as to
category fit arose in only twelve percent (thirty-six) of the cases. For
example, some of the subject firms, though not publicly traded, had
such high numbers of outside investors that they could not be
described accurately as closely held. Also, recurring issues
occasionally arose involving publicly traded firms that did not fit
neatly into either the Corporate Impropriety or the Exploitation of
Control category. For example, some involved a failure to pursue a
possible merger or the sale of the company. Such cases were relatively
few, and every effort was made to evaluate their individual facts and
place them in whichever category was the better fit.
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Any study that relies on reported decisions to make inferences
about the larger body of litigation faces methodological objections. 163
No assurance exists that written decisions or the opinions included in
databases are truly representative. That the opinions divide neatly
into certain categories does not prove that the entire universe of
shareholder derivative claims would do the same-but the prospect of
a significant "phantom" category that never finds its way into the
written opinions seems remote. More plausibly, that the cases in a
particular category of written opinions have certain attributes does
not establish that all cases in that category have those attributes. Yet
written opinions are the lawyer's stock and trade. The solution
therefore is not to dismiss judicial opinions as the focus of study, but
rather to be sensitive to possible sources of sample bias, and qualify
the inferences drawn from these opinions accordingly.
Institutional characteristics of the derivative suit, however,
make representativeness less of a problem than in other litigation
contexts. For example, if, as will often be the case, 164 defendants settle
more egregious cases quickly, then written opinions would give a
misleadingly low portrayal of the true risk of liability. But prospective
derivative suit defendants will be less drawn to out-of-court
settlements 165 because, in the absence of court approval, settling with
one shareholder may not bar others from bringing the same claim. 166
163. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CH. L. REV. 1, 15 (2002)
("We find that serious problems of inference and methodology abound everywhere we find
empirical research in the law reviews ... of the legal community."); George L. Priest & Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3-4 (1984) (noting habit
among legal scholars to infer rules from collections of cases and the challenges presented by
these inferences); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: JudicialInterpretations
of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1766 n.71 (1990) (recognizing limitations of study based on inference from
searched sample of cases); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges To
Executive Pay: An Exercise In Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 574-75 (2001) (recognizing
impossibility of determining frequency of shareholder challenges because of limits of empirical
research and sample selection bias). But see Richard L. Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal
Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 169 (2002) (offering defense of legal empirical scholarship and
counter-critiquing Epstein & King, supra).
164. Cf. Priest & Klein, supra note 163, at 14-17 (arguing parties are more likely to settle
disputes further removed from the standard of liability).
165. Judicially approved (or rejected) settlements, in contrast, often lead to written opinions,
which are included in the data set.
166. Of course, the corporation itself can always settle out of court with the defendants, at
which point the shareholders' attack is on the settlement rather than the underlying transaction.
E.g., Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994, 996-97 (2d Cir. 1965); Kahn v. Kaskel, 367 F. Supp. 784, 789
(S.D.N.Y 1973) ("[Nothing... prohibits a corporation from making an out-of-court
settlement ....Nonetheless, the corporation settling out of court acts at its peril for such a
settlement... fails to compromise or dismiss the derivative action [and] leaves the derivative
plaintiff free 'to challenge the settlement ....
").
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Further, prospective derivative plaintiffs and their attorneys may seek
to get their claims to the courthouse in hopes of being awarded control
of the case. For both of these reasons, a higher proportion of derivative
claims should result in filed lawsuits than for other types of disputes,
particularly in the Corporate Impropriety category. Out-of-court
resolution remains a more realistic possibility in the Closely Held
category and, to a lesser extent, the Exploitation of Control category,
where the number of prospective parties is smaller.
The Thompson and Thomas study of derivative litigation gives
insight into how many derivative suit filings lead to judicial
resolution. 167 By focusing on derivative suits filed in the Delaware
state courts during 1999 and 2000, their work includes many of the
cases that led to the written opinions in the present study. Derivative
litigation is characterized by extensive pretrial motion activity, which
enhances the likelihood that any particular filing will lead to a written
opinion. Thompson and Thomas identified eighty-three lead case
filings for the two-year period, with substantive motions filed in fiftythree of them. 168 The present study identified written decisions in one
hundred separate Delaware cases filed, in whole or in part, as
derivative suits over the relevant 7.25-year period. 169 On average,
therefore, at least one of every three lead cases yields at least one
written opinion. The breakdown between private and public
companies provides an additional check on the representativeness of
the data. In the Thompson and Thomas study, private companies
represented thirty percent of the total cases and twenty-eight percent
of those in which substantive motions were filed. 70 In the present
study, twenty-one percent of the Delaware cases that were filed as
derivative suits involved private companies.
The most interesting differences between the present results
and those of Thompson and Thomas relate to the role of the demand
requirement. Thompson and Thomas found that courts made a ruling
on demand in only eight of their eighty-three lead cases, with
defendants prevailing in five of them.' 7' They concluded that "demand
167. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 71.
168. Substantive motions were filed in fifteen of the twenty-five private-company cases in
their study, id. at 1767, and in thirty-eight of the fifty-seven public-company cases, id. at 1780.
169. Consistent with Thompson and Thomas, these one hundred cases include only those in
which a derivative claim was filed as such, and omit the twenty-one cases in which a purported
direct claim was ruled to be derivative. See id. at 1762 (selecting only suits originally filed as
derivative claims).
170. See id. at 1762 tbl.3 (distinguishing private and public entity derivative cases); see also
supra note 168 (calculating cases in which substantive motions were filed in study by Thompson
& Thomas, supra note 71).
171. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 71, at 1783.
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does not appear to be carrying as much of the weight of derivative
litigation as one might think given the attention devoted to that topic
in the academic literature and case commentary."' 172 The written
opinions in the present study suggest a different characterization:
Demand was at issue in forty of the opinions, 173 was alluded to in six
others, and had been addressed in prior opinions in six more.
Consistent with the Priest-Klein hypothesis, 174 outcomes in the forty
cases were evenly split-demand was excused in nineteen and
required in twenty-one. Further, of the twenty additional Delaware
cases where purported direct claims were ruled to be derivative, seven
were dismissed for failure to make a demand or to establish its
futility. Demand was an issue in an overwhelming number of the
federal cases as well.
This indicates, at a minimum, that active, substantive
litigation in derivative suits often concerns the demand requirement.
Thus, a fair inference is that the parties' assessment of the plaintiffs
ability to survive the demand requirement figures significantly in the
settlement value of those claims that never result in written opinions.
The resulting story is as follows: Prospective plaintiffs hardly ever
make pre-suit demands on the board. 175 The reasons are
understandable. To do so works as a concession of the board's
independence, 176 and the plaintiff only can overcome the board's
177
rejection of the demand by establishing that it was "wrongful,"'

172. Id.
173. Compare this forty percent rate with Thompson and Thomas's data on substantive
motions, which they defined to include "motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, motions
for summary judgment, and motions to dismiss for failure to make demand." Id. at 1767 n.84.
The eight rulings on demand in their study represent only fifteen percent of the fifty-three cases
in which substantive motions were filed. Id. at 1767, 1780, 1783. This suggests that judges are
more likely to issue written opinions when demand is at issue than when other grounds for
dismissal are asserted.
174. See Priest & Klein, supra note 163, at 17-20 (hypothesizing that because parties are
likely to take only close cases to trial, the outcomes of those cases should be split evenly between
plaintiff and defendant victories).
175. Thompson and Thomas found no Delaware cases in which a demand was made.
Thompson & Thomas, supra note 71, at 1782. I found only two. Burns v. Friedli, 241 F. Supp. 2d
519, 525-26 (D. Md. 2003); Canadian Commercial Workers Indus. Pension Plan v. Alden, No.
Civ.A. 1184-N, 2006 WL 456786, at *10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 2006). Also, wrongful refusal had been
addressed in an earlier opinion in another of the cases in the study. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d
1207, 1219-20 (Del. 1996).
176. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1217-20 (Del. 1996); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194,
212 (Del. 1991); Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 775-76 (Del. 1990).
177. Levine, 591 A.2d at 210-12; Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 n.10 (Del.
1981).
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without the benefit of discovery. 178 Unwilling to make demands,
plaintiffs must take their chances and hope to establish either that
demand is futile or that their claims qualify as direct rather than
derivative.
A. Closely Held Firms
For closely held businesses, the derivative suit plays a
subordinate role in redressing harm to minority shareholders.
Plaintiffs can use three alternative remedies and theories, at least one
of which is available in the vast majority of states.
Most prevalent are statutes that allow shareholders to petition
for dissolution or other relief on a variety of grounds, most notably
"illegal, fraudulent, oppressive, or unfairly prejudicial" conduct by
those in control of the corporation.179 Focusing on the term
''oppressive," several courts have interpreted this language broadly,
embracing any course of conduct that defeats the "reasonable
expectations" of the minority shareholder,18 0 although some recent
decisions have rejected such a broad approach.' 8 1 A second source of
redress derives from the doctrine originated by the Massachusetts
courts. Accordingly, because of the unique vulnerability of
shareholders in a close corporation, they owe one another the same
"utmost good faith and loyalty" as is owed among partners in a
general partnership.1 8 2 Several other states now take this or a similar
position.1 8 3 Because these duties run to the individual shareholder,

178. Scattered Corp. v. Chi. Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70, 77 (Del. 1997); Levine, 591 A.2d
at 208-09.
179. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.30(2)(ii) (1984) (dissolution); MODEL STATUTORY
CLOSE CORP. SUPP. § 40(a)(1) (1984) (multiple remedies). Similar provisions have been enacted in
the overwhelming majority of states. See 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 14.30 statutory
comparison (Supp. 2005); MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPP. statutory comparison (1988),
reprinted in 4 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN.
180. Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929, 932-34 (Mont. 1982); Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634
A.2d 1019, 1028-30 (N.J. 1993); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984);
Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 385-88 (N.D. 1987); Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's
Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699, 715-18 (1993); cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. §
302A.751(3a) (expressly incorporating "reasonable expectations" test); Meiselman v. Meiselman,
307 S.E.2d 551, 558-60, 562-65 (N.C. 1983) (noting that the statute authorized relief "reasonably
necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining shareholders").
181. Franchino v. Franchino, 687 N.W.2d 620, 629-30 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004); Kiriakides v.
Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257, 264-66 (S.C. 2001).
182. The seminal case is Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513-16 (Mass.
1975).
183. For a survey of the various state laws and decisions and a critical analysis of whether
Massachusetts truly represents the majority position, as many observers claim, see Mary Siegel,
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she need not sue derivatively to enforce them.18 4 Finally, a few states
follow the recommendation of the ALI 18 5 and grant the court discretion
to allow close corporation shareholders to obtain individual recovery
by bringing in a direct action what would otherwise be a derivative
18 6
claim.
Delaware, on the other hand, does not extend these protections
to the shareholders of close corporations. Neither its general
corporation provisions nor its subchapter governing close corporations
includes statutory dissolution or alternative remedies for oppression
or similar harm to minority shareholders.18 7 The Delaware Supreme
Court has rejected a shareholder's right to "equal treatment,"1 88 which
was the original focus of the Massachusetts case law, and disclaimed,
as a general proposition, the propriety of judicially created remedies
specific to the close corporation.18 9 And its courts have shown no
inclination to vary the traditional rules distinguishing derivative from
direct claims because the corporation in question was closely held. 190
Clearly, minority shareholders in Delaware close corporations
suffer the same vulnerability that led other states to develop special
remedies. Given the absence of these remedies as a formal matter,
Delaware courts therefore might approach derivative suits involving
close corporations in either of two opposing ways. On the one hand,
they might take a more relaxed approach to the procedural hurdles
ordinarily facing derivative suit plaintiffs, as this is the sole means for
the close corporation shareholder to obtain redress. Alternatively, they
might treat the fact of Delaware incorporation in contractual termsas a choice by the close corporation's organizers to avoid the prospect
of judicial intervention present in other states. While Delaware is the

Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close CorporateLaw, 29 DEL. J.CORP. L. 377, 380-82, 423-35, 471-89
(2004).
184. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 508 n.4; Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 220-22 (Ohio
1989) (holding that such suits in the context of close corporations may be brought as direct suits).
185. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.01(d)

(1992).
186. Barth v. Barth, 659 N.E.2d 559, 561-63 (Ind. 1995); Richards v. Bryan, 879 P.2d 638,
647-48 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994); Durham v. Durham, 871 A.2d 41, 45-46 (N.H. 2005).
187. The general provisions include a procedure for revocation of a corporation's charter on
grounds of "abuse, misuse or nonuse of its corporate powers, privileges and franchises," but that
remedy is available only to the Attorney General. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 284(a) (2001). The
only special remedy created by the close corporation subchapter is the appointment of a
provisional director if the board is deadlocked. Id. § 353(a).
188. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1377 (Del. 1993).
189. Riblet Prods. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 39 n.2 (Del. 1996); Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1379-81.
190. See Bagdon v. BridgestonelFirestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379, 383-84 (7th Cir. 1990)
(summarizing the Delaware case law).
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jurisdiction of choice for publicly traded corporations, 19 1 its role for
closely held firms is more limited, as organizers and their lawyers
often favor local chartering of either a corporation or limited liability
company. 192 A fair inference is that closely held businesses opting for
Delaware are ones in which planning, certainty of legal treatment,
and perhaps private ordering arrangements play a more significant
role. Courts might require that legal challenges by minority
shareholders be filtered through the conventional requirements
governing derivative suits out of respect for these arrangements (or
their absence).
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Nixon v. Blackwell
may appear to favor the latter, stricter approach. The court observed:
The tools of good corporate practice are designed to give a purchasing minority
stockholder the opportunity to bargain for protection before parting with consideration.
It would do violence to normal corporate practice and our corporation law to fashion an
in a court-imposed stockholder buy-out for which the
ad hoc ruling which would 19result
3
parties had not contracted.

Some aggrieved shareholders of Delaware close corporations based in
Massachusetts or other states with stricter fiduciary standards have
brought suit close to home, arguing for the application of local law.
This approach is not unfounded, given the preponderance of local
relationships that characterize the majority of closely held firms. Thus
far, however, courts generally have rebuffed these efforts and looked
194
to Delaware law under the "internal affairs" doctrine.
Minority shareholders of Delaware close corporations actually
may fare better than the Nixon language suggests. Of the fifty-six
cases with opinions addressing substantive issues in the Closely Held
category, the plaintiff prevailed in full or in part in thirty-two. Subject
to the issues of representativeness discussed in the introduction to
this Part, a fair inference from these results is that a substantial
191. According to the Delaware Department of State, more than fifty percent of all U.S.
publicly traded companies and sixty percent of the Fortune 500 are incorporated in Delaware.
Delaware Division of Corporations, http://www.corp.delaware.gov/default.shtml (last visited Jan.
4, 2008).
192. For example, out of the thirty-nine states for which responses for 2006 are available,
Delaware accounted for only 4.1 percent of the new business incorporations and 7.2 percent of
the new LLCs. National Association of Secretaries of State, Survey on Company Formation
Processes in the States 1-2 (July 25, 2007); see also Thompson & Thomas, supra note 71, at 1761
(estimating Delaware's share of non-public incorporations at less than 3.5 percent).
193. 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993).
194. E.g., Nagy v. Riblet Prods. Corp., 79 F.3d 572, 576-78 (7th Cir. 1996); Harrison v.
NetCentric Corp., 744 N.E.2d 622, 627-29 (Mass. 2001); Olsen v. Seifert, No. 976456, 1998 WL
1181710, at *4-5 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Aug. 28, 1998). But see Powers v. Ryan, No. CIV. A. 00-1029500, 2001 WL 92230, at *1 n.1 (D. Mass. Jan. 9, 2001) (applying Massachusetts law under the
"significant relationship test").
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number of close corporation shareholders are able to overcome the
procedural restrictions facing derivative plaintiffs, at least at the
pleading stage.
Close corporation shareholders may have some of this success
because their suits are more likely client driven, in contrast to the
stereotype of their public corporation counterparts. But there are
additional explanations. For one, many of the Closely Held cases share
characteristics with the Exploitation of Control cases (the only
difference being the dispersion of the equity ownership). Therefore,
they benefit from the Delaware courts' evolving view of the
direct/derivative distinction discussed in Section IV.C. 195 Further, the
classic close corporation case involves those in control receiving some
benefit to the exclusion of the minority. Those circumstances give rise
to self-dealing or other duty of loyalty claims that are often difficult to
dismiss at the pleading stage. 196 Of course, pleading a breach of
loyalty is different from proving it, but the burden is ordinarily on the
directors to prove the entire fairness of their dealings. In terms of
ultimate outcomes, Thompson and Thomas found that plaintiffs
obtained affirmative relief in nine of the twenty-five close corporation
derivative suits that they studied.197
The recent case of Feldman v. Cutaia illustrates many of these
points. At issue was a series of private placements of the corporation's
stock and other securities, followed by a repurchase offer two or three
years later. 198 The plaintiff, a cofounder of the company but no longer
a director, challenged both the inadequacy of the issue price and the
excessiveness of the repurchase price. Specifically, he alleged that the
defendants had paid the equivalent of between $1.90 and $4 per share

195. Thompson and Thomas, for example, found twice as many direct actions as derivative
actions filed against close corporations. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 71, at 1785. In the
present study, on the other hand, cases consisting only of direct claims that are upheld as such
would not be included. Claims held to be direct enter the study only because: (i) they are joined
with derivative claims in the same case, or (ii) an initial decision holding them to be derivative
claims was reversed on appeal. E.g., Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91 (Del. 2006). Gentile, by the
way, is an example of one of the cases that raised issues as to categorization. It was placed in the
Exploitation of Control category due to the court's reference to "public" shareholders, although
there is little to indicate the stock was publicly traded.
196. See Siegel, supra note 183, at 419-21 (noting that greater scrutiny does not reflect
special rules for close corporations, but prevalence of self-dealing claims governed by entire
fairness standard); Thomas & Martin, supra note 163, at 586 (discussing reasons why
shareholder challenges to executive compensation are more successful in close corporations);
Thompson & Thomas, supra note 71, at 1767 (remarking that close-corporation claims usually
entail majority shareholder's duty of loyalty, so independence required for demand is lacking).
197. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 71, at 1766-67.
198. For relevant facts, see Feldman v. Cutaia, Civ. A. No. 1656-N, 2006 WL 920420, at *5-8
(Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 2006).
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while the repurchase offer had been at $10. Because a majority of the
board or their affiliates participated in the private placements, the
court agreed that demand was excused as futile and allowed the
claims to proceed. In a subsequent opinion, however, the court
expressed some skepticism as to whether Feldman actually had been
foreclosed from participating in the private placement. 199 What did
him in was the company's merger following the earlier opinion, which,
under the doctrine of Lewis v. Anderson,20 0 defeated his standing to
pursue the derivative claims. Feldman tried to avoid this outcome by
arguing that his claim for wrongful dilution qualified as "direct" in
light of the recent Delaware cases discussed in Section IV.C. But the
court held that he had failed to establish that the directors were
tantamount to a single controlling shareholder for purposes of that
201
doctrine.
In sum, the aggrieved minority shareholder of a Delaware close
corporation presents a mixed blessing. The distinctive characteristics
of the typical shareholder dispute within a close corporation may
make it easier for the plaintiff to bring a direct claim or establish
demand futility than it would be in the publicly traded context. Yet, as
the Feldman case reminds us, derivative litigation includes several
other procedural obstacles that may impede the plaintiffs path to
ultimate relief.
B. CorporateImpropriety
1. Surveying the Cases
Plaintiffs did not fare well in the Corporate Impropriety cases.
They prevailed or survived a motion to dismiss in only twenty-six of
the cases, while courts dismissed their claims in eighty-six. The
opinions in the other forty cases in this category involved either
procedural matters (consolidation, appointment of lead counsel,
remand to state court, etc.) or judicial review of settlements and fee
awards. The results are even more lopsided when the cases for
recovery of short swing profits under section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act are removed. 20 2 These suits must be brought
derivatively but with no demand requirement. Without these cases,
199.
2007).
200.
201.
202.

Feldman v. Cutaia, No. Civ.A. 1656-VCL, 2007 WL 2215956, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1,
477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984).
Feldman, 2007 WL 2215956, at *6-9.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000 & Supp. II).
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the plaintiffs' survival rate on motions to dismiss drops to eighteen out
of one hundred cases.
On the issue of demand, courts dismissed fifty-seven of the
cases for failure to make a demand and excused demand in only
sixteen, two of which then were dismissed on the merits. This onesidedness is not surprising. The Corporate Impropriety cases typically
involve issues of oversight, with duty of loyalty claims usually
confined to matters of executive compensation. As a result, a majority
of the board rarely will have a disabling conflict of interest.
To the extent that the opinions in the data set are
representative of the underlying litigation, the message is clear. The
demand requirement and other grounds for an early motion to dismiss
operate as rigorous screening mechanisms to block plaintiffs with
Corporate Impropriety claims from access to the courts, including the
right to discovery. Is this sound policy? An examination of the features
of the underlying claims gives a better appreciation of the
consequences of this screening.
a. FinancialFalsehoods;Fraud
The largest share of cases (sixty-four of 152) involved claims
that the defendants were responsible for false or misleading
information about the corporation's business and financial condition,
or that they concealed negative information. While an occasional case
was premised on defrauding a specific third party, almost all involved
fraud upon the financial markets generally, in circumstances where
securities class actions also had been filed. Thus, it is questionable
what these cases add by way of either compensation or deterrence.
They simply may be the result of a lawyer whose client neither bought
nor sold during the applicable class period, but still held shares and
wanted a piece of the case. Active participation in the fraud was rarely
alleged; rather, liability was premised on the defendants' failure to
detect or stop it. In about twenty-eight percent of the cases, plaintiffs
also included claims of insider trading.
Plaintiffs fared worse in this subcategory of cases than in the
Corporate Impropriety category as a whole-surviving dismissal in
only six of the forty-five rulings. The breakdown between demand20 3
required and demand-excused cases was twenty-six to six.
203. While the numbers are too small to support much in the way of generalization, nothing
suggests a systematically different approach to demand between the federal and Delaware state
courts. Combining the financial fraud claims with the other oversight cases discussed below, two
of the eight demand-excused decisions were by the Chancery Court, as were ten of the forty
decisions requiring demand.
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Interestingly, though, this category produced the largest monetary
settlement-$54 million in the Cendant Corporation case, although
that amount pales in comparison to the record $3.2 billion settlement
of the securities class action that was the basis for the derivative
204
claim.
b. Other Oversight
Plaintiffs fared no better in oversight cases not based
principally on the corporation's financial fraud. Courts excused
20 5
demand in only two of seventeen cases and dismissed the rest.
These cases generally involved Caremark-type claims, 20 6 where
shareholders sought recovery for losses resulting from the board's
failure to prevent wrongful conduct, ranging from racial
discrimination 207 to bid rigging in the insurance industry. 20 8 Only the
occasional case included allegations of an affirmative act by the
board.209

While plaintiffs in suits alleging financial fraud or other types
of oversight claims may succeed rarely, the successful case is likely to
be lucrative. At least four of the eight cases where plaintiffs survived a
motion to dismiss ultimately settled, all with significant attorneys'
fees or monetary awards. 21 0 A plaintiff in an oversight case therefore
faces a dilemma. These cases are highly fact-dependent, turning on
how much the board members knew and when they knew it. The
plaintiff must convince the court to excuse demand, relying only on
whatever information has become publicly available. This study
suggests that success is a long shot, a proposition consistent with
Chancellor Allen's characterization of oversight cases as "possibly the

204. In re Cendant Corp., Derivative Action Litig., 232 F. Supp. 2d 327, 336 (D.N.J. 2002).
205. Opinions in four other cases in this sub-category dealt with other procedural issues.
206. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch.1996) (requiring
"sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight" in order to establish lack of
good faith). The Caremark standard recently has been endorsed by the Delaware Supreme Court
in Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364-65 (Del. 2006).
207. In re Texaco Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 123 F. Supp. 2d 169, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
208. Fener v. Gallagher, No. 04 C 8093, 2005 WL 2234656, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2005).
209. See, e.g., White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543 (Del. 2001) (settlement of paternity suit against
CEO); Litt v. Wycoff, No. Civ.A. 19083-NC, 2003 WL 1794724 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2003) (bonus
plan that encouraged high-risk lending).
210. McCall v. Scott, 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001) (corporate governance provisions and $14
million settlement); In re TASER Int'l S'holder Derivative Litig., No. CV-05-123-PHX-SRB, 2006
WL 687033 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2006) (corporate governance provisions; $1.75 million in attorneys
fees); Dollens v. Zionts, No. 01 C02826, 2002 WL 1632261 (N.D. Ill.
July 22, 2002) (corporate
governance provisions; $600,000 attorneys fees); Saito v. McCall, No. Civ.A. 17132-NC, 2004 WTL
3029876 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2004) ($30 million settlement, of which $6 million was attorneys fees).
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most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might
hope to win a judgment."2 11 But the substantial corporate losses
incurred in these cases increase the settlement value of a successful
demand-excused claim. And based on an analysis of the written
opinions, outcomes are difficult to predict. This uncertainty likely is
caused by the requirement that the judge predict, at this early stage of
the case, where the facts ultimately will fall on the spectrum between
a "mere threat" and "substantial likelihood" of liability.2 12 Economic
theory predicts that, under these conditions, risk-averse plaintiffs
attorneys would tend to settle before testing their demand futility
allegations in court, and many probably do. But the substantial
number of cases in this subcategory suggests that, for whatever
reason, a significant number of plaintiffs take their chances.
The substantial literature generated by the Priest-Klein
hypothesis contributes several possible explanations for this
reluctance to settle at the demand stage-among them the differential
stakes of the parties and the relatively low cost of litigating
demand. 21 3 Especially relevant are the incentives for strategic
behavior created by asymmetric information. 21 4 Dependent as they are
on the subjective knowledge of individual directors at particular points
in time, oversight claims typically will give rise to a significant
differential between what the plaintiff and defendant know at the
outset of the case. Defendants who appreciate that they are at risk
therefore might be tempted to settle the case early, when the demand
requirement still blocks the plaintiffs access to discovery. But
plaintiffs, aware of their low overall probability of success, likely
would see this early willingness to settle as a tip-off of the defendant's
liability and therefore will hold out. Innocent defendants, on the other
hand, lack a low-cost means of convincing the plaintiff that the case

211. Caremark,698 A.2d at 967.
212. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993). Given this indeterminacy, it is
significant that the Delaware Supreme Court now reviews demand futility de novo. Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253-54 (Del. 2000). After an oversight claim is dismissed at the chancery
level, the plaintiffs threat to appeal retains substantially more settlement value than under a
more deferential standard.
213. For summaries of the reasons why the success rate of plaintiffs may deviate from the
tendency toward fifty percent predicted by Priest & Klein, see Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining
Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for
Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 237-48 (1996); Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?:
An Empirical Study of Predictorsof Failureto Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 319-24 (1999).
214. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information,
15 RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984); Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1993) (examining the effects of asymmetric
information upon parties' decisions whether or not to settle).
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has no merit, so they often will find it cheaper to seek dismissal based
on the plaintiffs failure to make a demand.
Because the core conduct in these oversight cases is already the
subject of legal prohibitions, it is again doubtful that the derivative
suit provides additional deterrence. Officers and directors already are
stigmatized-and perhaps penalized-for their involvement in the
underlying violations. And indemnification and insurance usually will
cover any personal liability that the derivative suit creates.
Furthermore, as the foreign payments cases and current stock option
backdating cases reveal, the conduct giving rise to the suit may come
to light years after the fact. Legal standards and public attitudes may
have changed in the interim. Thus, if the case goes to trial, the court
must attempt to recreate the circumstances of the prior time in
assessing what board members should have foreseen.
c. Executive Compensation
The second largest group of cases (thirty-two, including three
cases that overlapped with the financial fraud category) arose from
compensation arrangements. The most frequent claims related to
stock option irregularities and compensation based on subsequently
restated earnings. Once again, plaintiffs fared poorly on the whole,
surviving dismissal in only five of twenty-two rulings. 2 15 Courts
dismissed claims for either failure to make a demand or failure to
state a claim. The underlying rationale was essentially the same in
both contexts: the business judgment rule protected the board's
decision and the plaintiff failed to make an adequate case for waste.
From a policy standpoint, this subcategory is more compelling
than the oversight subcategories because it is more likely to raise duty
of loyalty issues, and derivative litigation often will be the
shareholder's sole means to raise them. 2 16 Nonetheless, in a
comprehensive survey of decisions going back to the early 1900s,
Professors Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin found that public
corporation shareholders succeeded far less often in challenging
compensation arrangements than did their counterparts in close

215. One of these was an earlier ruling in the Disney case, In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003), which plaintiffs would go on to lose. In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
216. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 163, at 576 (noting that shareholder challenges to
executive pay almost always take the form of derivative suits).
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corporations. 21 7 Compare this with the present study, where plaintiffs
in this subcategory succeeded only by identifying a specific flaw in the
process for approving the compensation arrangement. 21 8 However, this
is one subcategory of Corporate Impropriety cases where the risk of
out-of-pocket liability continues to pose a viable deterrent threat. For
example, in Valeant Pharmaceuticals International v. Jerney, the
Delaware court ordered a former officer-director not only to repay the
full $3 million bonus he had received-with no offset for the amount of
what a "fair" bonus might have been-but also to reimburse a share of
the corporation's SLC expenses. 2 19 Also in this subcategory is the
proposed settlement that, if approved, would be the largest derivative
suit recovery ever 22 0-the more than $900 billion to be repaid by
former UnitedHealth Group executives to settle backdating charges. 22 1
d. Other Claims
The only other substantial subcategory of claims (thirteen)
encompassed those arising from a merger or other change-of-control
transaction, as challenges either to a board's decision to enter a
particular transaction or to its failure to pursue an alternative. In
almost all of these cases, the shareholders had the opportunity to
pursue direct claims through a class action, so the availability of
derivative relief was not essential for them to obtain redress.
Few of the Corporate Impropriety claims raised classic duty of
loyalty issues. Outside the compensation and merger areas, only three
cases alleged self-dealing or corporate opportunity. And those
plaintiffs attained more success than other plaintiffs in this
category-perhaps because these cases tend to border on the
Exploitation of Control category.

217. Id. at 585-87. This is an example of a context in which it would be interesting to go
beyond the conventional public-close dichotomy and examine the experience of controlled public
corporations as a separate group.
218. See, e.g., Seinfeld v. Barrett, No. Civ.A. 05-298-JJF, 2006 WL 890909 (D. Del. Mar. 31,
2006) (misleading disclosure of tax consequences); In re Tyson Foods, Inc., 919 A.2d 563 (Del. Ch.
2007) (issuance of spring-loaded options while in possession of non-public information); Ryan v.
Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 2007) (backdating of options in violation of shareholder-approved
plan).
219. 921 A.2d 732, 751-56 (Del. Ch. 2007).
220. Margaret Cronin Fisk & Avram Goldstein, UnitedHealth's Former Chief to Repay $600
Million (Update8),
BLOOMBERG.COM,
Dec. 6,
2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601087&sid=a.lhETzJe3CQ &refer=home.
221. See Eric Dash, Former Chief will Forfeit $418 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at C1;
Vanessa Fuhrmans & James Bandler, Ex-CEO Agrees To Give Back $620 Million, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 7, 2007, at Al.
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Interestingly, all three of these cases arose from situations that
were front-page news, and the Delaware Court of Chancery decided
them all. HealthSouth222 challenged the corporation's acceptance of
stock from its CEO in retirement of his $25 million debt. The court
granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on the grounds of unjust
enrichment and equitable fraud. 223 The plaintiff in Teachers'
Retirement v. Aidinof/ 24 claimed that AIG executives diverted
valuable business to an affiliated company whose principal
shareholder was AIG's CEO. Its claim for a constructive trust survived
a motion to dismiss. 225 Finally, plaintiffs established demand futility
and stated a claim for relief in alleging that eBay insiders had
usurped a corporate opportunity by participating in IPO allocations
226
from the company's investment banking advisor.
The relative paucity of classic duty of loyalty cases in the data
set suggests one of two things. Either the current combination of
deterrent forces (media scrutiny, public enforcement, and class and
derivative litigation) effectively operates to prevent more blatant
loyalty breaches in our largest and most closely watched corporations,
or the parties are quick to settle any litigation when these situations
arise. Whichever the explanation, the results in these cases should
provide some reassurance to those who fear that the derivative suit is
on its deathbed.
2. Derivative Suits as Public Goods
One consequence of SLCs and the best interest test has been to
focus attention on the extent to which much of the potential benefit
traditionally attributed to derivative litigation represents a classic
public good. 227 As such, the particular corporation that is subject to
suit and its shareholders are called on to underwrite the cost for the
benefit of shareholders generally. This point is especially relevant to
evaluating the case for oversight and other subcategories of Corporate
Impropriety claims where the prospect for meaningful monetary
recovery is remote and, even when obtained, almost always will be
covered by indemnification or insurance paid for by the corporation.

222. In re HealthSouth Corp S'holders Litig., 845 A.2d 1096 (Del. Ch. 2003), affd, 847 A.2d
1121 (Del. 2004).
223. Id. at 1099.
224. Teachers' Ret. Sys. of La. v. Aidinoff, 900 A.2d 654 (Del. Ch. 2006).
225. Id. at 673.
226. In re eBay, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. C.A. 19988-NC, 2004 WL 253521, at *4 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 23, 2004).
227. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 122, at 85.
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With the compensation rationale thus marginalized, justification for
the suit must come from other sources.
The most obvious candidate is deterrence. But even though
deterrence is widely cited as one of the principal benefits of derivative
litigation, how much of that benefit does the subject corporation
capture? Obviously, it is too late to deter the misconduct that spawned
the suit. As to the future, maintaining the derivative suit operates as
a deterrent only to the extent that it signals future management that
some future shareholder, board, or SLC also will maintain a suit.228
The derivative suit also might deter future harm for corporate
America, in an amount that substantially exceeds the costs of suit,
and therefore may be socially desirable. 229 But should the
shareholders of the corporation that is subject to the suit be forced to
subsidize it?
One class of shareholders may endorse this subsidization. As
repeat players, institutional investors stand to reap the benefits of
general deterrence across their portfolio holdings. 230 As the securities
class action faces more obstacles, these investors increasingly may see
derivative litigation as an alternative to address corporate
improprieties. On the whole, the discussion of administrative
enforcement and white collar criminal prosecution in Section III.D.2
suggests that the fight against corporate impropriety now is funded
more by public dollars. While shareholders generally may welcome
this result, it will not always work to their favor, because public
enforcement means that the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders are no longer the touchstone. One can imagine
circumstances in which public officials elect to pursue general
deterrence objectives even at the risk of harming some of the
shareholders that the law is designed to protect. No comparable threat
arose when the misconduct was solely the subject of derivative
litigation capable of settlement at the corporation's behest. The
prospect of Apple shareholders losing the unique talents of CEO Steve

228. Cf. Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in ShareholderInterests?, 82
GEO. L.J. 1733, 1748-50 (1994) (discussing future deterrence benefits as an incentive to bring
suit).
229. Note, though, the assumption necessary for even this external deterrence to operate.
What does the decision by Corporation X's SLC to bring suit communicate to managers of other
corporations about the willingness of their own boards or SLCs to bring suit down the road?
230. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOCY REV. 95, 100-02 (1974) (discussing repeat players' incentives to
play for rules rather than outcomes).
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Jobs as a result of the stock options backdating scandal is a recent
23 1
case in point.
Even though the costs and benefits of general deterrence
ordinarily may favor public over private enforcement, situations likely
exist where establishing the bounds of permissible conduct will yield
deterrence benefits that are substantial and specific to the
corporation. One example is a corporation in a highly regulated
industry or whose businesses or business practices otherwise gives
rise to the recurrent risk of unlawful conduct. 232 This case typically
will fall in the Corporate Impropriety category, and, as discussed
earlier, the deterrent role of derivative litigation must be evaluated
relative to the body of other enforcement mechanisms. Substantial
corporation-specific deterrence also is likely when dealings between
the corporation and a parent company, controlling shareholder, or
other affiliated party create an ongoing risk of abuse-the kinds of
cases that make up the Exploitation of Control category.
The other public good that sometimes is cited on behalf of
derivative litigation is the production of precedent. Over the years,
derivative suits have served as a principal source of this precedent.
But there are certainly alternative settings in which courts address
the duties of care and loyalty. These include direct suits by the
corporation itself, suits by bankruptcy trustees or representatives of
creditors following the corporation's insolvency, and class actions in
the context of an acquisition. The present study used two sources to
test the continuing importance of derivative suits as a source of
precedent-corporate law casebooks and the Delaware Supreme
Court's recent Disney opinion.
Six leading casebooks were considered, and all cases included
in the chapters dealing with the duties of directors or controlling
shareholders were tallied. 233 This produced a total of 120 cases. 23 4 A

231. See Conrad de Aenlle, Figuring out the P.E. Ratio of Steve Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
2007, at C6; Alan Murray, If Mr. Jobs Is Punished, Would Holders Suffer?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17,
2007, at A14; Joe Nocera, Nice Phone, Mr. Jobs, But..., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2007, at C1
(discussing Apple shareholders' reactions to the fact that Steve Jobs might leave).
232. The risk of price-fixing in the power equipment industry at issue in the classic case of
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963) is an example.
233. JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS
904-17 (5th ed. 2003 & Supp. 2006); JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 851-61 (6th ed. 2004); MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATION AND OTHER
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-CASES AND MATERIALS 667-96 (9th ed. unabr. 2005); ROBERT W.
HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATIONS-INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES 720-57 (9th ed. 2005); WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONSAGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 232 (6th ed. 2006); CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY &
ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 367-98 (5th ed. 2006).
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slight majority (sixty-three) was pure derivative suits. Of the
remaining cases, fifty-three were direct suits, and four were either
mixed or unclear as to the nature of the claim. As in other contexts,
however, the evidence suggested that tighter demand requirements
and deference to SLCs might be reducing the significance of derivative
litigation as a source of leading cases. Of the 120 cases, seventy-two
were decided after 1980. Of these, derivative suits represented only
45.8 percent of the total, compared to 62.5 percent of those decided
earlier.
The Disney235 case was selected as the most important recent
case on the duties of directors. The court relied on fifteen (thirteen
different) Delaware decisions in its separate discussions of the
business judgment rule, the duties of care and loyalty, good faith, and
the test for waste. 236 Of these, nine were derivative suits. Further, the
age distribution of these cases is the opposite of the casebook
opinions-all but one of the derivative suits were decided after 1980,
compared to only half of the other cases. Thus, even though derivative
suits may be losing some of their centrality as a teaching tool, their
role as the leading source of precedent on directors' duties retains its
vitality, at least outside the acquisition context, where class actions
now dominate.
The composition of the cases by category likewise is instructive.
Among the casebook derivative suits, slightly more than half (thirtyfour) fell into the Corporate Impropriety category. Of the others,
twenty involve exploitation of control, and thirteen involve closely held
corporations. The make-up of the Disney precedents is even more onesided-eight of the nine derivative suits involve corporate impropriety.
A recurring theme of this article has been the emergence of
substitutes for much of the role traditionally played by derivative
litigation in the Corporate Impropriety setting. These results reveal
an important exception: derivative suits grounded on corporate
impropriety continue to be a fundamental source of governing legal
principles. Further, they make a different kind of contribution to the
body of corporate law than do the other two categories. Specifically,
cases in the Exploitation of Control and Closely Held categories
typically involve concrete applications of the duty those in control owe
to minority shareholders. Corporate law gives controlling insiders
234. As is to be expected, several of the cases were included in multiple casebooks. For
purposes of this study, each such inclusion was counted as a separate case, as a means of
weighting the case's relative importance.
235. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
236. Again, when a case was cited in multiple discussions it was counted separately each
time.
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considerable latitude to run the corporation as they see fit.
Understandably, they generally will favor their own priorities and
objectives over those of the minority. Derivative litigation performs
the task of translating the abstract concepts of fiduciary obligation,
good faith, and fairness into the specific limits on the insiders' ability
to favor themselves.
To be sure, Corporate Impropriety cases do this as well, though
in situations involving managerial rather than shareholder control,
such as executive compensation. And the judicial guidance more
typically goes to permissible process rather than to permissible
outcome. But these cases do something more. Over the years, they
have provided the foundation for discussing what it means to be an
outside director of a public corporation.
There is no field manual, code of conduct, formal training, or
licensing body to spell out what directors ought to do in a particular
situation. Instead, this responsibility usually has begun with the
courts and works in two separate ways. Most visibly, the courts are
(subject to the legislature) the definitive author of the director's formal
legal obligations. Equally as important, their opinions are the raw
material for a dialogue across the business and legal professions as to
what should be expected of directors.2 37 The factually rich chronicles of
boardroom behavior that are the hallmark of the Delaware courts are
particularly well suited to this task. 238 These judicial pronouncements
then are analyzed, critiqued, and extrapolated in law review articles,
client memos, the business and financial press, continuing legal
education programs, and training institutes for present and
prospective directors. In the process, an updated appreciation of what
it means to be an outside director often evolves. We can think of this
as the "culture" of corporate governance. While this culture may lack
the force of law, it nonetheless remains highly influential in shaping
the attitudes of the business, education, and former governmental
leaders who constitute public company boards and whose reputation
for integrity and competence is critical to their careers.
One effect of the stricter demand requirements has been to
reduce the volume of case law available to shape culture. Perhaps
"reorient" is a better term than "reduce." Litigation over demand
237. For a fuller explication of the continuum of performance criteria for directors, from
obligation to expectation then to aspiration, see Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Director's Duty of
Oversight, in

PROCEEDINGS TO COMMEMORATE

THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY

OF THE

KOREAN

COMMERCIAL CODE 2-7 (Seoul Oct. 2002).
238. Ed Rock has elaborated on this process in the case of MBO opinions. Edward B. Rock,
Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016,
1024-25 (1997) (describing Delaware opinions as "corporate law sermons").
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futility and deference to independent directors has produced a
substantial number of fact-specific discussions on what it means to be
independent. Likewise, because challenges to acquisitions typically
are direct claims by the corporation's shareholders or competing
bidders, a rich body of law and culture has developed to address how
directors should act in an acquisition context. But detailed
performance assessments in other settings are rare. This is
unfortunate. Even though, for the reasons discussed earlier, the
Corporate Impropriety cases rarely will lead to liability in derivative
suits, the courts' opinions can help shape a boardroom culture that
reduces the risk of the underlying impropriety.
Delaware's restrictive approach to demand in Corporate
Impropriety cases has affected the production of precedent in a second,
more subtle way. Many derivative plaintiffs are choosing to file
elsewhere. Almost all of the option backdating suits involving
Delaware corporations, for example, have been brought either in
federal court or in the courts of the state where the corporation is
headquartered or does substantial business. Conversations with
lawyers indicate that a principal reason for this phenomenon is that
corporations want to avoid Delaware's demand requirement. However
respected these other courts may be, their opinions, lacking both the
precedential value and narrative style of their Delaware counterparts,
are unlikely to make the same kind of contribution to corporate
governance law and culture.
From a choice-of-law standpoint, this forum shopping seems
pointless, given the consensus that issues of demand are to be
governed by the state of incorporation's law. 239 The assumption must
be that Delaware judges will interpret and apply the state's law of
demand more strictly than their out-of-state colleagues. 240 To date, the
evidence on this point from the backdating cases is to the contrary. 24 1
239. See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108-09 (1991); McCall v. Scott,
239 F.3d 808, 815, amended in part by 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001); Blasband v. Rales, 971 F.2d
1034, 1047 (3d Cir. 1992); Hicks v. Lewis, 148 S.W.3d 80, 83-87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Moonlight
Invs., Ltd. v. John, 192 S.W.3d 890, 893-94 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding that under Texas statute,
demand requirement is substantive rather than procedural); SETH ARONSON ET AL., Shareholder
Derivative Actions: From Cradle to Grave, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, 2006 SECURITIES
LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE, 1557 PLI/Corp 125, 147 (2006).
240. For example, one leading law firm has counseled Delaware-incorporated clients to
amend their bylaws to require Delaware as the forum for any derivative suit. Leslie A. Gordon,
Partner Advisory: Pick Your Forum, 8-K MAG., Summer 2006, at 37-38, available at
http://www.bingham.com/Media.aspx?MedialD=2991.
241. The D&O Diary lists fifteen backdating derivative suits that have been dismissed to
date, with all but one in federal court. (The lone Delaware decision is Desimone v. Barrows, 924
A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 2007).) Conversely, four of the five suits that have survived a motion to
dismiss have been in the Delaware Court of Chancery. See Options Backdating Lawsuits:
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Nonetheless, these developments highlight the significance of the
Chancellor's observations in Ryan v. Gifford about Delaware's strong
interest in having its own courts decide novel questions of fiduciary
242
duty under Delaware law.
C. Exploitation of Control
1. Surveying the Cases
Exploitation of Control cases typically involve transactions
with someone who arguably was in control of the corporation. The
most common fact pattern involved direct self-dealing, often in
connection with the issuance or redemption of the corporation's
shares. In all, thirty-one cases fell within this subcategory, in whole or
in part. Another fifteen cases involved intercompany dealing or asset
shifting among organizations under the defendant's common control.
The only other substantial subcategory, something of a catch all,
included cases where the defendant pursued a particular strategy for
its own benefit to the detriment of the shareholders. In some cases,
this was accomplished through the corporation, such as by causing it
to buy out the stock of a competing block holder. In other cases, it was
done directly, by failing to provide promised financing, for example.
No claims of the latter variety survived a motion to dismiss, but
interestingly the cases were never dismissed for failure to state a
claim.
Given the element of control and the attendant duty of loyalty
issues, plaintiffs should be more successful in these cases than in
Corporate Impropriety cases. The data supports this hypothesis.
Plaintiffs prevailed or survived a motion to dismiss in twenty-eight
cases; courts dismissed their suits in forty-three cases. The remaining
thirteen cases dealt with procedural or settlement issues. This
breakdown is closer to the even split predicted by the Priest-Klein
hypothesis, which may indicate that the applicable legal standards
embody less uncertainty than in the Corporate Impropriety cases,
particularly in the oversight subcategories. Likewise, given the small
size of the corporations in this category and the tendency of the
plaintiffs to hold larger shares of the equity, each side will have access

Settlements, Dismissals, Denials, D & 0 DIARY, available at http://69.177.1.186/clients/blog/
optionsbackdatingtable.doc (last updated Feb. 28, 2008) (tracking settlements, dismissals, and
denials).
242. 918 A.2d 341, 349-50 (Del. Ch. 2007).
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to the facts. As a result, opposing counsel more likely will place
similar value on the shareholder's claim.
Notwithstanding the control dimension to these cases, the
demand requirement continued to present a challenge for plaintiffs.
Courts dismissed derivative claims for failure to make demand in
twelve of the cases, compared to ten in which courts ruled that
demand was futile. This pattern reflects plaintiffs' difficulty in
overcoming the demand requirement where a majority of board
members is not interested personally in the transaction, even though
their status as board members is subject to the defendant's control.
Understandably, claims of self-dealing and intercompany
dealing experience the greatest success in overcoming the demand
requirement. Of the thirty-five claims that fall into one or both of
these subcategories, courts only dismissed four on demand grounds.
Importantly, these results may signal a subtle shift away from the
strictness of Aronson when a controlling shareholder is involved.
To evaluate the significance of this, we start with the
recognition that Delaware law features a range of context-specific
tests for challenging transactions involving controlling shareholders.
Among these, the requirements for excusing demand as futile may be
the most rigorous. As we saw in Section II.B, to overcome the
presumption of director independence, Aronson makes clear that the
plaintiff must do more than show that the director was nominated or
elected at the behest of the defendant. Even proof of majority share
ownership will not suffice. Rather, in addition to overall control,
particular facts must demonstrate that "through personal or other
relationships the directors are beholden to the controlling person."243
That person's influence over the directors must be so great that it
"sterilizes their discretion. '244
Whether this full force of Aronson should extend to the
Exploitation of Control cases is questionable. As we have seen, both
the remedial and deterrent aspects of derivative litigation play a far
more substantial role for these cases than for those in the Corporate
Impropriety category. Thus, entrusting the suit to those selected by
and serving at the pleasure of the defendant is much more
problematic. Further, under Delaware law, self-dealing transactions
involving a controlling shareholder generally are subject to the "entire
fairness" test 24 5-a standard sufficiently rigorous that its applicability

243. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984).
244. Id. at 814.
245. Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115-17 (Del. 1994); Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719-20 (Del.
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is sometimes described as outcome determinative. 246 Unlike most
situations to which the demand requirement applies, negotiation and
independent-director approval of the transaction does not invoke the
protections of the business judgment rule; it simply shifts the burden
of proving fairness. 24 7 Nonetheless, under Aronson's second prong,
demand will be required so long as the challenged transaction was
"the product of a valid exercise of business judgment. 248 Likewise, a
director can be deemed independent under the first prong of Aronson
even though the corporation is treated as controlled for purposes of the
entire fairness test. The latter occurs whenever a shareholder owns a
majority of the shares or exercises actual control over the corporation's
business and affairs 24 9 -neither of which is sufficient to satisfy the
"beholden" requirement of Aronson.
The upshot is that, taking the legal doctrine at face value,
plaintiffs in many Exploitation of Control cases face higher formal
hurdles in overcoming the demand requirement than in prevailing on
the merits. However, two factors mitigate this result in practice. First,
as discussed below, many types of transactions involving controlling
shareholders will give rise to individual claims, making demand
unnecessary. Second, as some of the opinions in the data set suggest,
where the control relationship is clear, courts may be exhibiting
greater flexibility in excusing demand, the black letter of Aronson
250
notwithstanding.
1971). While Lynch, Weinberger, and many of the other leading cases involved mergers, several
post-Lynch decisions have treated the entire fairness standard as applicable to controlling
shareholder transactions generally. T. Rowe Price Recovery Fund, L.P. v. Rubin, 770 A.2d 536,
552 (Del. Ch. 2000); In re MAXXAM, Inc./Federated Dev. S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 12111, 1997
WL 187317, at *13 (Del. Ch. Apr. 4, 1997); Kahn v. Tremont Corp., No. 12339, 1996 WL 145452,
at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 1996), rev'd on othergrounds, 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997).
For analytical surveys of Delaware's approach to controlling shareholders, see Ronald J.
Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785 (2003);
Mary Siegel, The Erosion of the Law of Controlling Shareholders, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 47-70
(1999); Steven M. Haas, Note, Toward a Controlling Shareholder Safe Harbor, 90 VA. L. REV.
2245, 2250-70 (2004).
246. See, e.g., AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch.
1986) (discussing how the standard of judicial review is outcome determinative).
247. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428-29 (Del. 1997); Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys.,
Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994); Cooke v. Oolie, No. Civ. A. 11134, 2000 WL 710199, at *13
n.41 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2000); see Siegel, supra note 245, at 39-42 (discussing shifting burdens).
248. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
249. Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1113-14; Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d
53, 70 (Del. 1989); In re PNB Holding Co. S'holders Litig., No. 28-N, 2006 WL 2403999, at *9-10
(Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006); In re W. Nat'l Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 15927, 2000 WL 710192, at *6
(Del. Ch. May 22, 2000); see Siegel, supra note 245, at 33-39 (discussing controlling
shareholders).
250. The Exploitation of Control cases in the data set that excused demand in the face of
allegations of self-dealing by a controlling shareholder include In re Trump Hotels S'holder
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In addition to the demand requirement, however, shareholders
in the Exploitation of Control cases face another obstacle that plays a
far more important role than in the other categories: standing. In all,
courts dismissed twenty-six of the derivative claims on standing
grounds. 25 1 The most frequent reasons were a subsequent merger
(seven cases) or bankruptcy (eight cases), but other difficulties
satisfying either the contemporaneous or the continuing ownership
requirements were present as well. It is understandable, given the
typically thin trading in the stock of these corporations, that
identifying a plaintiff who has retained ownership of his or her shares
throughout the required period may prove a challenge. Accordingly,
the distinction between direct and derivative claims is particularly
important in this category.
Here too, Delaware courts have demonstrated an increasing
willingness to provide minority shareholders of controlled corporations
access to the courts. The law on these issues continues to evolve and
some recent opinions are particularly noteworthy. For a claim to be
deemed direct rather than derivative, Delaware courts traditionally
looked to whether the shareholder suffered a "special injury," either a
wrong "separate and distinct" from that suffered by other
shareholders or a contractual right (such as the right to vote)
independent of the rights of the corporation. 252 Nonetheless, there are
well-recognized categories of direct claims where the harm by its
nature tended to affect all shareholders equally, such as claims
involving false or misleading disclosures 253 or claims challenging a
merger on grounds of fairness of the price or approval process. 254 Thus,
minority shareholders in controlled corporations (and, indeed,

Derivative Litig., Nos. 7820 DAB & 8527 DAB, 2000 WL 1371317 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2000); In re
Limited, Inc., No. 17148-NC, 2002 WL 537692 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002); In re Student Loan Corp.
Derivative Litig., No. C.A. 17799, 2002 WL 75479 (Del. Ch. Jan. 8, 2002); In re New Valley Corp.,
No. 17649, 2001 WL 50212 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2001); Grace Bros., Ltd. v. Uniholding Corp., No.
17612, 2000 WL 982401 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2000).
251. Plaintiffs in three of these cases, as well as one of the demand-required cases, were held
to have direct claims in addition to their dismissed derivative claims, so a portion of their cases
survived.
252. Lipton v. News Int'l, 514 A.2d 1075, 1078 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 490
A.2d 1059, 1069-70 (Del. Ch. 1985), affd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Elster v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
100 A.2d 219, 222 (Del. Ch. 1953).
253. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 282 (Del. 1977); Agostino v. Hicks, 845
A.2d 1110, 1120-21 (Del. Ch. 2004).
254. Parnes v. Bally Entm't Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1245 (Del. 1999); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 1987 WL 4768, at *5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 1987). But see Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus.,
Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 353 n.4 (Del. 1988) (holding that the claim that golden parachute payments
and excessive fees reduced consideration paid to shareholders in merger was derivative not
direct).
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shareholders generally) regularly have been allowed to pursue these
sorts of claims through individual suits or class actions, without
having to satisfy the pleading and other requirements for a derivative
suit. Similarly, courts have been more willing to allow shareholders to
proceed directly, even in the absence of a "special injury" to the
plaintiff, when the shareholders are seeking equitable relief to
invalidate corporate action for lack of authority or other procedural
255
improprieties.
In its 2004 Tooley decision, the Delaware Supreme Court
sought to rationalize this divergent body of law by formally
abandoning the "special injury" test. Instead, to decide whether the
claim is direct or derivative, "the analysis must be based solely on the
following questions: Who suffered the alleged harm-the corporation
or the suing stockholder individually-and who would receive the
benefit of the recovery or other remedy?" 256 By framing the test in this
manner, the court specifically rejected the proposition that "an action
cannot be direct if all stockholders are equally affected or unless the
stockholder's injury is separate and distinct from that suffered by
257
other stockholders.)5
While this expanded availability of direct recovery applies to
shareholders across the range of corporations, it has special relevance
to the Exploitation of Control cases. The fact that the controlling
shareholder's fiduciary duty runs not only to the corporation but also
to the shareholders creates an accommodating framework for
recognizing separate harm at the shareholder level. As a result, some
forms of self-dealing can be characterized, even though the corporation
is the party directly impacted, as giving rise to direct, as well as
derivative, grounds for relief.258 Thus far, this has been most evident
in cases alleging dilution as the result of an issuance of shares to those
in control for inadequate consideration. The Tri-Star line of cases,
each of which reversed the chancery decision below, demonstrates the
Delaware Supreme Court's openness to creative approaches through
which minority shareholders challenging that dilution can sue and
recover on their own behalf.2 59 And a recent chancery opinion takes

255. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS §

7.01 cmts. c-d (1992); see also Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1213 (Del. 1996) (citing
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE).

256. Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1035 (Del. 2004).
257. Id. at 1038-39.
258. See, e.g., Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91, 99-100 & n.19 (Del. 2006) (noting the possible
dual character of a claim).
259. Gatz v. Ponsoldt, 925 A.2d 1265 (Del. 2007); Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91 (Del.
2006); In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig., 634 A.2d 319 (Del. 1993). While Tri-Star arose under

444

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 61:2:387

this doctrine one step further, permitting the shareholder to sue
directly in the case of other types of self-dealing by controlling
shareholders when the alleged purpose was to drive down the value of
260
the plaintiffs shares.
In sum, these two still-evolving bodies of doctrine-a more
flexible approach to control under Aronson and the creative expansion
of the Tri-Star doctrine-have important implications for aggrieved
minority shareholders of controlled public corporations. They carry
with them the potential to reverse some of the effects of the restrictive
post-Gall approach to pre-suit demand.
2. Deterrence, Again, and the MBCA
Attempts to measure directly the deterrent effects of derivative
suits necessarily will be speculative. It is the classic challenge of
proving a negative. The observable event that some scholars have
focused on is the derivative suit filing. Yet this is a rare event in the
life of any firm. 261 And because deterrence lies in the prospect of suit,
the actual filing is often, if anything, a signal that deterrence has
broken down. 262 An alternative is to measure the underlying conduct
the "special injury" rubric and entailed an element of deception, the more recent, post-Tooley,
cases seem willing to ground a direct dilution claim on breach of fiduciary duty alone. See
Rossette, 906 A.2d at 99-100. In the most recent of these cases, Gatz v. Ponsoldt, the court went
so far as to recast the transaction into its economic equivalent in order to bring it within the
doctrine, much as in a tax case. 925 A.2d at 1278-81.
Another evolving issue is what suffices to establish "control" for purposes of this doctrine. In
Tri-Star, although the defendant did not own a majority of the shares, the court detailed its
defendant's control at both the board and shareholder levels, including the existence of
shareholder agreements that embraced affecting 56.6 percent of the voting power. 634 A.2d at
328-29. Gatz involved the holder of 38.45 percent of the equity which nonetheless had conceded
its "de facto control" in response to another argument. 925 A.2d at 1275. On the other hand, as
we saw in Section IV.B, Feldman v. Cutaia, No. Civ. A. 1656-VCL, 2007 WL 2215956, at *1-12
(Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 2007), recently refused to extend the Tri-Star doctrine to a less-than-majority
holder. Although the directors and their families collectively held more than a majority, the court
declined to aggregate these holdings in the absence of a voting agreement or other pact. Id. at *89.
260. Rhodes v. Silkroad Equity, LLC, No. Civ. A. 2133-VCN, 2007 WL 2058736, at *5 (Del.
Ch. July 11, 2007).
261. Romano's study of 535 public corporations found that a corporation will experience any
type of shareholder suit (derivative suit or class action), on average, only once every forty-eight
years. Romano, supra note 122, at 59.
262. An early event study by Fischel and Bradley illustrates the problem. They examined
abnormal stock price returns on the dates of court decisions dismissing or refusing to dismiss a
derivative suit against the issuing corporation. Abnormal returns were positive (negative) when
the suit was allowed to proceed (dismissed), but were in no cases statistically significant. Based
on this lack of significance, Fischel and Bradley concluded that "derivative suits are not an
important monitoring device to curb managerial malfeasance." Fischel & Bradley, supra note
121, at 282. This ignores, however, any pre-filing deterrence created by the threat of suit. We
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targeted for the deterrence. The problem, of course, is that parties
ordinarily will try to cover up the targeted activity (fraud, self-dealing,
mismanagement, etc.). At least in the case of self-dealing, however,
SEC filings require disclosure under threat of penalties strong enough
to assure substantial compliance. While few will be forthcoming about
what they would have tried to get away with had the rules been
looser, a rough estimate can be derived by comparing behavior before
and after a particular deterrent is implemented or removed.
In 1990, the MBCA adopted a tough approach to derivative
suits. Demand is required as a pre-condition to suit in all cases, 263 and
courts are required to accept the independent directors'
recommendation to dismiss the suit so long as that recommendation
was made in good faith following a reasonable investigation. 264 To
date, these provisions have been enacted in twenty-one states. 265 In at
least some of those states, these statutes overruled case law that had
taken a more accommodating approach to the derivative suit.
Three states provide instructive examples: Texas, Iowa, and
North Carolina. Texas is the largest state to adopt the MBCA
derivative suit provisions. Prior Texas case law recognized the board's
ultimate authority over the decision whether to sue on the
corporation's behalf, but did not go as far as the MBCA amendments.
Demand was excused when the alleged wrongdoers controlled the
corporation, at either the shareholder or the board level. 266 A 1979
decision indicated that, in such a demand-excused case, the board was
divested of the power to terminate the shareholder's suit 267-an issue
268
that the Texas Supreme Court specifically left open on appeal.
Conversely, when demand was required, the shareholder could not
proceed with the suit without showing fraud, oppression, or abuse of
power in the board's refusal to act. 269 On balance, therefore, the
MBCA provisions appear to have weakened the threat of derivative
litigation as a deterrent in Texas.

cannot dismiss the possibility that even more misconduct might have occurred had that threat
not existed.
263. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.42(1) (1990).

264. Id. § 7.44(a).
265. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.44 Stats. (3d ed. Supp. 2005).
266. Becker v. Dirs. of Gulf City St. Ry. & Real Estate Co., 15 S.W. 1094, 1098 (Tex. 1891);
Zauber v. Murray Sav. Ass'n, 591 S.W.2d 932, 937 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Barthold v. Thomas,
210 S.W. 506, 507-08 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919).
267. Zauber, 591 S.W.2d at 938-39.
268. Zauber, 601 S.W.2d at 940.
269. Cates v. Sparkman, 11 S.W. 846, 848-49 (Tex. 1889); Langston v. Eagle Publ'g Co., 719
S.W.2d 612, 616-17 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
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Iowa and North Carolina are states whose pre-statute case law
went the furthest in protecting the shareholder's right to maintain
suit. In Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., Iowa's Supreme
Court held that director-defendants in a derivative suit lacked the
power to create an SLC with the authority to decide whether that suit
should proceed. 270 The North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the
structure of Zapata's two-step test, but in the second step, it required
the trial court to exercise its own business judgment as to whether the
suit should continue. 271 As part of the process, the court was to make
its own "fair assessment of the report of the special committee, along
with all the other facts and circumstances in the case, in order to
determine whether the defendants will be able to show that the
transaction complained of was just and reasonable to the
272
corporation."
These states' approaches to derivative suits are most relevant
to the Exploitation of Control cases. Corporations whose shares are
not widely traded may see the benefits of Delaware law as
unnecessary and opt for local incorporation. A list of the public
companies incorporated in these three states reveals only a few
"household names," and their SEC filings indicate that many have
shareholders with majority control or a substantial control block.
To evaluate whether the adoption of the MBCA provisions in
these states affected behavior that might be deterred by the threat of
derivative suit, this study examined both cash compensation to the
CEO 273 and related party transactions for the two years before and
after enactment. The study included all SEC-reporting companies
with data available for the relevant five-year period, which produced
seventy-seven corporations. The group consists of twelve Iowa
corporations, thirty-six North Carolina corporations, and twenty-nine
Texas corporations. The resulting data are summarized in Table 2 and
are consistent with the propositions that derivative suits may have
some deterrent effect on self-dealing, and that the MBCA provisions
temper that effect. But the evidence is weak at best.

270. 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 1983).
271. Alford v. Shaw, 398 S.E.2d 445, 452-53 (N.C. 1990).
272. Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 328 (N.C. 1987).
273. Non-cash compensation might create an even greater risk of abuse. Because of changes
in disclosure rules over the course of the study, however, comparisons had to be confined to the
cash component.
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Table 2. Compensation and Self-Dealing
Pre-Statute

Post-Statute

Iowa

$321,943

$397,230

North Carolina
Texas
Mean CEO Compensation

$412,650
$496,500

$487,800
$562,749

Iowa
North Carolina

$414,653
$558,321

$668,898
$691,287

Texas
Related Party Transactions

$758,729

$864,182

Iowa
North Carolina

17
38

19
47

Texas

36

42

Median CEO Compensation

For the seventy-seven companies, median annual CEO
compensation grew by 21.9 percent, and the mean by 23.1 percent,
between the two-year periods before and after enactment of the MBCA
amendments. This is roughly equivalent to an increase of ten percent
per year. Given the combination of inflation and the growth of CEO
compensation generally, this rate appears modest. Among individual
companies, twenty-three saw increases of fifty percent or more, with
CEO compensation more than doubling at four companies and tripling
at another. As the numbers in Table 2 imply, Iowa had a
disproportionate share of the substantial increases. But given the
obstacles to challenging the level of CEO compensation, even under
unrestricted access to derivative litigation, much more evidence is
needed to support the conclusion that the statutory changes played a
role in these increases.
Evidence of the effect on related party transactions is
somewhat more persuasive. This inference is based not so much on the
quantity of transactions, but on their nature. The data in Table 2
indicate that between sixty and seventy percent of the companies
reported at least one related party transaction annually both before
and after the amendments. 274 Overall, the number of such reports

274. The data in Table 2 count the number of companies, not the number of transactions,
each year. A company that reported related-party transactions in each year of the relevant two-

448

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:2:387

increased by 18.7 percent between the two year periods, with the
increases spread fairly evenly among the three states. To get the full
flavor, however, one needs to read the descriptions of the reported
transactions in the companies' proxy statements. The proxy
statements indicate a noticeable increase in the number of
transactions that, because of either their size or character, might
invite attention, particularly in corporations with controlling or
substantial block holders. Examples include opening a corporate office
in Pakistan, the residence of the company's chairman and controlling
shareholder (Burke Mills. Inc.); the $4.5 million sale of a company to
an entity controlled by the chairman of the board (Cash America
International); regularly housing management trainees and other
employees at hotels co-owned by the CEO (Food Lion Corp.); cash
advances to the controlling shareholder and a diverse range of
business dealings with his son-in-law (Ingles Markets, Inc.); and
$200,000 in payments for using a controlling shareholder's private
aircraft (Meredith Corp.).
Some, perhaps all, of these transactions may have
substantially benefited the corporations and their shareholders. That
is the point about self-dealing made in the Introduction-it will often
be mutually desirable. It is plausible, though, that companies
nonetheless might be reluctant to enter into these kinds of
transactions for fear of shareholder criticism and that diluting the risk
of shareholder litigation, at the margin, can cause the corporation to
take the risk (and to openly disclose it).
Further complicating this assessment is the fact that the
MBCA's restrictions on derivative suits have not proven as
comprehensive in practice as the statute's black letter might suggest.
Thus far, the case law in the states adopting the MBCA has yielded
wide-ranging outcomes and reveals the confusion that can result when
a body of traditionally judge-made law becomes the subject of detailed
codification. While far from uniform, the predominant tendency has
been for courts to find ways to offset the statute's strictness. Chief
among these has been the continuing willingness to excuse demand
when deemed futile, 275 notwithstanding the clear statutory intent to

year period would be counted as "2" whether the number of transactions, or the amounts
involved, increased or decreased.
275. Simon Prop. Group, Inc. v. Taubman Ctrs., Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 919, 934-36 (E.D. Mich.
2003), vacated on other grounds, 373 F.3d 656 (6th Cir. 2004); Foslip Pharm., Inc. v. Metabolife
Int'l, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 891, 908 (N.D. Iowa 2000); McDonough v. Americom Int'l Corp., 151
F.R.D. 140, 142-43 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Saunders v. Firtel, No. CV054007690, 2006 WL 3908560, at
*3 n.7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 27, 2006); Guarino v. Livery Ltd., Inc., No. X04CV030127824, 2003
WL 22853729, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2003); Ezzone v. Riccardi, 525 N.W.2d 388, 394
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make the demand requirement universal. 276 Courts in MBCA states
also have been receptive to allowing disgruntled shareholders to bring
their claims directly, whether through resort to the ALI's close
corporation exception, 277 Delaware's Tri-Star doctrine, 278 or another
avenue. 279 Finally, in those cases where the board or an SLC has
recommended dismissal, courts applying the MBCA test generally
have taken a rigorous approach to assessing the directors'
independence and good faith, as well as the reasonableness of their
28 0
investigation.
There is, on balance, significant evidence that courts in MBCA
states have been inclined to temper the strict approach embodied by
the statute. One explanation, consistent with the overall thrust of this
Article, is that they are being called on to apply doctrines that arose
out of, and are best suited to, the Corporate Impropriety category to
cases falling almost exclusively in the Closely Held and Exploitation of
Control categories.

n.2 (Iowa 1994) (dicta); Kubik v. Kubik, 683 N.W.2d 330, 336-37 (Neb. 2004); Sadler v. Jorad,
Inc., 680 N.W.2d 165, 170 (Neb. 2004); Schrager v. Isquith, No. CH05-272, 2005 WL 2546648, at
*1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 19, 2005).
276. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.42 & official cmt. (1990). Illustrative of the overall level of
uncertainty, several courts-including some in jurisdictions cited in the preceding footnotehave held that the Model Act abolished the futility exception. Firestone v. Wiley, 485 F. Supp. 2d
694, 701-02 (E.D. Va. 2007); Virginia M. Damon Trust v. N. Country Fin. Corp., 325 F. Supp. 2d
817, 821-22 (W.D. Mich. 2004); Dunn v. Ceccarelli, 489 S.E.2d 563, 567-68 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997);
Mannos v. Moss, 155 P.3d 1166, 1173 (Idaho 2007); McCann v. McCann, 61 P.3d 585, 593 (Idaho
2002); Speetjens v. Malaco Inc., 929 So. 2d 303 (Miss. 2006); Allen ex rel. Allen & Brock Constr.
Co., Inc. v. Ferrera, 540 S.E.2d 761, 765 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons'
Farms, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 248, 261-62 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); Schroeder v. Equitable Bank, SSB, No.
97-2960, 1998 WL 538499, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1998).
277. Byelick v. Vivadelli, 79 F. Supp. 2d 610, 624-25 (E.D. Va. 1999); Durham v. Durham,
871 A.2d 41, 44-46 (N.H. 2005); cf. Derouen v. Murray, 604 So. 2d 1086, 1091 n.2 (Miss. 1992)
(discussing court discretion to treat derivative claims as direct).
278. Albers v. Edelson Tech. Partners, 31 P.3d 821, 826-28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); Grace Bros.,
Ltd. v. Farley Indus., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 814, 816 (Ga. 1994).
279. Jorgensen v. Water Works, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (reviewing a
claim that majority shareholders and directors paid themselves fees and bonuses that were in
fact dividends).
280. Klein ex rel. Klein v. FPL Group, Inc., No. 02-20170, 2004 WL 302292, at *15-24 (S.D.
Fla. Feb. 5, 2004); Kloha v. Duda, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (M.D. Fla. 2002); McDonough v.
Americom Int'l Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1016, 1020-21 (M.D. Fla. 1995); Melton v. Blau, No.
X04CV030103953S, 2004 WL 2095317, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2004); Batur v.
Signature Props. of Nw. Fla., Inc., 903 So. 2d 985, 994-97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Einhorn v.
Culea, 612 N.W.2d 78, 84-93 (Wis. 2000).
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V. CONCLUSION

This Article has examined how the role played by derivative
litigation today varies significantly with the category of cases
involved. To a considerable extent, it is a lesson in the availability and
functioning of substitutes. For Corporate Impropriety, efficient
securities markets, media scrutiny, and public enforcement combine to
provide shareholders with much of the protection traditionally
associated with the derivative suit, without the cost and distraction
associated with nuisance litigation. For closely held firms, intershareholder conflicts can be addressed before the fact by contract and
after the fact by a variety of ad hoc remedies. None of these
alternatives realistically is available, however, for the kinds of
companies and situations that typify the Exploitation of Control
category. While their stock trades in the public markets, making
private arrangements and shareholder-specific remedies unworkable,
these companies often are too small to merit serious scrutiny by
financial analysts or the media. Consequently, the derivative suit
retains critical importance.
The fact that these Exploitation of Control cases have been
overlooked throughout much of the recent debate over derivative suits
has broader implications. Historically, these issues were an important
focus of the law school casebooks and the study of corporate law.
However, with the emergence of corporate governance as a standalone topic, and continuing with the takeover wave of the 1980s, the
issues raised by large-cap, widely held corporations increasingly have
dominated the discourse in both corporate law teaching and
scholarship. Just as the close corporation emerged as a distinct object
of study in the 1960s, perhaps the time has come for similar
recognition of the controlled publicly traded corporation.
Corporate control has substantial value, as recognized by both
the law and the marketplace. Yet the legal limitations on that value
depend on the vague precepts of fiduciary obligation. Derivative
litigation performs not only the task of righting particular wrongs but
also of translating these general precepts into tangible rules. These
rules well may be the most exportable part of U.S. corporate
governance. Outside the United States and the United Kingdom, the
controlled publicly traded corporation is the predominant form of
private business organization. 28 1 Thus, in the words of two leading

281. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance:
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1645-48 (2006) (discussing
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international finance scholars, "the main focus of the literature on
investor protection and its role in the development of financial
markets ... is on the amount of private benefits that controlling
shareholders extract from companies they run."28 2 For countries
seeking to improve their corporate governance without the tradition or
institutional infrastructure to develop a case law of their own, the
United States' accumulated doctrine on the limits of control will prove
highly valuable.

corporate control in various countries); Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the
World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999) (discussing various forms of business ownership around the world).
282. Alexander Dyck, & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International
Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 537 (2004) (citing Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and
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